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Abstract

Financial statement fraud, the "falsification of an organization's financial
statements to make it appear more or less profitable:' (Association 10), carries the most
financial impact on businesses of all type of fraud. It is often perpetrated by upper level
management and accounting departments. Since the occurrence of the frauds at Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, major changes are occurring in the business community
and the accounting profession, ranging from new standards and legislation to an
increased emphasis on corporate ethics. Numerous new accounting standards and
congressional acts have been issued in an effort to prevent such frauds from occurring
again through the reduction of loopholes and complexity in current accounting standards.
New pieces of legislation, are moving big business and the accounting profession towards
greater transparency in financial reporting as well as increased accountability tor the
issuers offmancial statements and their auditors. The renewed effort to reduce the
complexity of reporting standards has taken hold as well as an increased focus on
corporate social responsibility and ethical leadership in the workplace.

~

.._____
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Introduction- Financial Statement Fraud
Six-hundred and fifty-two billion dollars is a staggering amount of money to lose,
and according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners' [ACFE] "Report to the
Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse," this is the amount of revenues estimated to be
lost by U.S. companies to fraud in 2006, equating to five percent of the United States'
gross domestic product (Association 4). As one can clearly see, fraud has an extremely
significant financial impact on businesses, both large and small as well as the economy as
a whole. The ACFE Report to the Nation states that small businesses on average actually
experience higher median losses from fraud than even the largest corporations (5). Fraud
can be found in all types of business and can range from the simple stealing of office
supplies to the highly complex world of financial statement fraud. It is fmancial statement
fraud that causes the greatest financial impact.
Financial statement fraud, the "falsification of an organization's financial
statements to make it appear more or less profitable" (Association 10), frequently
overlaps with other occupational frauds such as asset misappropriation and corruption.
Furthermore, financial statement fraud, despite occurring only in 10.6% of all the cases
detailed in the ACFE Report to the Nation, carries the most significant impact on the
effected organization, resulting in an average loss of $2 million dollars. The report also
shows the-frequency of fmancial statement fraud by functional department within
companies. Upper level management and executives accounted for fifty percent of the
fraud reported in the study, with individuals from the accounting department causing an
additional seventeen percent (Association 50), and it was individuals from these
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departments who committed the record breaking frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and
Adelphia.
Since the occurrence of these frauds, the accounting profession and the business
community have undergone and are undergoing a multitude of changes, ranging from
new standards and legislation to an increased emphasis on corporate ethics. Numerous
new accounting standards and congressional acts have been issued in an effort to prevent
such frauds from occurring again through the reduction of loopholes and complexity in
current accounting standards. These new pieces of legislation, such as the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of2002 and FASB Financial Interpretation No. 46R, are moving big business
and the accounting profession towards greater transparency in financial reporting as well
as increased accountability for the issuers of financial statements and their auditors. The
renewed effort to reduce the complexity of reporting standards has taken hold as well as
an increased focus on corporate social responsibility and ethical leadership in the
workplace. Corporate social responsibility is the new wave for companies to grow their
bottom lines, while also creating a positive image in the eyes of the public to help prevent
future financial statement frauds. Unfortunately, it was the massive frauds and
breakdowns in corporate ethics at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, and other
companies that provided the catalyst for these significant changes.

Chapter 1- Enron and WorldCom: The First of Many
Enron
One could hardly imagine that a company at the top of its industry could fall so
hard and so fast. The reality was, however, that while the financial statements showed
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Enron as a top performer, things were not exactly how they appeared. Enron was formed
in 1985 from the merger between Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth to create the first
nationwide network of natural gas pipeline (Jickling, "The Enron Collapse," 111 ). The
company's leader, Kenneth Lay, began his time with the company as CEO of Houston
Natural Gas in 1984 in the midst of a large string of Wall Street acquisitions and mergers.
Houston Natural Gas was no exception. Lay doubled the size of his company with a
buyout of Florida Gas and Transwestern Pipeline, expanding the reach of the company's
pipeline from California to Florida (Fox 12). His next goal was to merge with
InterNorth, a natural gas company much like Houston Natural Gas, based in Omaha,
Nebraska. While this merger was taking place, the steps towards deregulating the natural
gas industry were being taken by the Reagan administration, and since the newly formed
Enron Corporation already had a natural gas pipeline that spanned much of the country,
the trend toward "deregulation of the energy industry was creating new markets, new
opportunities, and new temptations" (Fusaro 10).
The newly deregulated energy markets enabled Enron to shift its focus in the
energy industry. The company moved from being a producer and transporter of natural
gas and electricity to largely being a derivatives dealer, "trading on the value of assets
purchased and sold by others" (Jickling, "Enron Bankruptcy" 138). These derivative
instruments derived their value from the underlying worth of the assets being traded. For
example, Enron's gas contracts were sold based on the value of the underlying natural
gas rather than the value ofthe contract itself.
Enron's problems with accounting frauds started soon after the company's
formation. In 1987, Ken Lay founded Enron Oil, a trading company that speculated on
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the future price of oil. This new division was seen to be a great success to Enron's
headquarters, producing $50 million dollars in added profit to the Enron Corporation in
1987 (Fusaro 21). However, this was not truly the case. The trading division was
working with two different sets of accounting books: those that would be shown to Enron
headquarters with substantial profits, and those that showcased the true nature of the
trading division. This second set ofbooks tallied all of the losses that Enron Oil had
sustained by ending up on the wrong side of oil trades. Before it was finally discovered
after intervention from the U.S district attorney, the division's losses cost Enron $142
million (Fox 18). Despite the early warning sign ofthings to come, the Enron Oil scandal
was dismissed by Lay, according to Fusaro and Miller, as a "detour on the path to
success" (Fusaro 22). Some even say that this fraud early on, while providing warning
signs of the massive fraud to come, also provided Enron with experience in how to better
cover up its losses (Fusaro 23).
Jeffery Skilling, a Harvard Business School Graduate and McKinsey and
Company consultant joined Enron in 1990 and revolutionized its business. Sixteen years
later, Skilling would be found guilty of fraud and conspiracy and sentenced to twentyfour years in prison for his role in Enron's financial statement fraud (Emshwiller). When
hired as a consultant, Skilling had Enron set up a "gas bank" to create greater flexibility
in the natural gas market. Essentially, this bank created long-term natural gas contracts
with suppliers. These contracts were then subsequently split up into pieces and then
swapped, with Enron reaping profits for creating the contracts and by acting as the
middleman in the transaction (Fusaro 33). These transactions also left Enron exposed to
significant risk with the possibility that it could get stuck with a contract to deliver gas
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when energy prices were unusually high. To hedge the risk inherent in these transactions,
Enron then formed Enron Risk Management Services. After winning over Lay with his
revolutionary approach to the natural gas market, Skilling left McKinsey and Company to
join Enron as the CEO ofEnron Gas Services, Skilling's newly named gas bank. By
forming this new bank, Enron, as Peter Fusaro and Ross Miller state in their literary work
What Went Wrong at Enron, "planted the seeds of its own destruction by becoming the
center of the natural gas universe" (Fusaro 33).
Before Skilling was willing to join Enron and run the newly created gas bank, he
made one demand that was a significant factor in the financial statement fraud that
occurred at the company. Because the gas contracts that Enron was dealing in were new
to the natural gas industry, there was no standard way of valuing or accounting for them.
Skilling demanded that Enron Gas Services use what is called mark-to-market
accounting. He so greatly wanted this accounting method in recording these contracts
that it was "a lay-my-body-across-the-tracks issue" and told Lay that he would not join
Enron unless he could use this method (McLean 39). This method allowed Enron to
book all of the revenues of its gas contracts as soon as the contract was sold. If the
contract was to cover ten years, for example, all ten years of revenues received from this
contract were to be booked immediately, rather than recognizing the revenue over the
course of the ten year contract. Skilling's rationale behind using this method of
accounting, which was so different from the traditional historical cost approach, was the
fact that portfolios on Wall Street were often accounted for using this method. Since this
new gas bank and trading of contracts was similar to holding a portfolio in the stock
market, Skilling felt it was a good fit for the emerging practice. However, a fundamental

Christian 6
flaw in this way of thinking was that the natural gas contracts created by Enron were very
difficult to value. While the stock market has an easily attainable method of valuing the
shares of a portfolio, and thus an accurate method to adjust the value of the portfolio to
the market price, the natural gas contracts trading market had no such method of
valuation (McLean 40). This caused the reported value of these contracts to, more often
than not, be reported at far above their actual value. When convincing the SEC to allow
Enron to use mark-to-market accounting, Skilling even obtained a statement from Arthur
Andersen, the company's auditors, stating that it was preferable for the company to use
mark-to-market accounting.
While the mark-to-market accounting at Enron may have been questionable as to
how accurately it was portraying the true value of the underlying transactions, what
caused the most trouble and resulted in the fraudulent financial statements of the
company was the company's heavy usage of special purpose entities [SPEs]. These
special purpose entities provided a vehicle for the company to engage in a variety of
business transactions without having the company directly involved, insulating its
financial risk. By establishing the SPEs, Enron could engage in many transactions and
keep them off of the company's financial statements provided that certain conditions
were met.
In 1990, the Enron Corporation brought in Andrew Fastow, who would later

become the company's Chief Financial Officer and be largely credited with setting up the
SPEs used by the company (Fusaro 37). It was these special purpose entities that allowed
Enron to keep millions of dollars in debt off of its fmancial statements. However, not all
ofthese SPEs were illegally used. In the early 1990's, Enron was still establishing its
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newly formed natural gas market and was acquiring significant assets and their related
debt. . As the creator of the natural gas market, Enron served as a liquidity provider in the
market. To do this, however, it needed to buy up as much natural gas that it could from
distressed suppliers and then resell it when the market timing was right. Fastow used
SPEs to keep the debt of these gas purchases off ofEnron's financials (Fusaro 61). Since
the bulk ofEmon's business was now in the natural gas trading market, the company had
few assets and enormous debts, despite Emon being in a favorable position in regards to
market knowledge of the natural gas industry.
As the profits earned on natural gas contracts faded due to increasingly educated
market traders in natural gas, Enron had to look elsewhere to obtain these profits through
the creation of new markets (Fusaro 64). In 1998, Enron entered into the electricity
mark~t

by acquiring electricity generation facilities both directly and indirectly (66).

Again, Emon used one ofFastow's SPEs to finance the acquisitions which he bragged
about in CFO Magazine by saying "We accessed $1.5 billion in capital but expanded the
Emon balance sheet by only $65 m[illion]," hiding. a substantial amount of the debt
(Fusaro 66). Enron was not content to stop creating and trading in only the markets of
natural gas and electricity. The company eventually traded in "everything from tradable
pollution rights to metals, pulp, paper, and other industrial commodities such as specialty
chemicals" (66).

In November 1999, Enron launched what was to be considered one ofthe chief
reasons for its spectacular growth, profits, and revenues: EnronOnline. By February of
the next year, EnronOnline was involved in processing one thousand transactions a day in
a wide range of commodities worth over $450 million, and by July 2001, that number had
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grown to five thousand per day worth over $3 billion._ The system drastically simplified
the trading of its contracts. According to Fusaro and Miller, this system is "a principal
reason that Fortune magazine continued to select Enron as the most innovative company
in the United States for a period of six straight years, from 1996 to 2001 " (Fusaro 75).
EnronOnline continued expanding until it was involved with trading over 1,800 products
in thirteen different currencies, all in markets that avoided regulation by the SEC (78).
These transactions helped Enron to post a huge increase in revenues of $60 billion from
1999 to 2000, a 150% increase over 1999's numbers.
However, these spectacular revenues were not accurately telling the whole story
because much of these amounts stemmed from the method used in accounting for the
transaction rather than the substance of it, resulting in overly inflated revenues. Usually
trading companies can only book the revenues associated with the spread involved in the
transaction when trading securities. However, the trade of energy contracts and other
goods that are not considered to be fmancial instruments allowed Enron to book the entire
amount of the sale as revenue per the fair value accounting found in SFAS No. 133. This
spectacular growth allowed Enron to grow large enough to place fifth on the Fortune 500
in 2002 (Moore 1), making the fall of the energy and trading giant that much more
significant.
Enron, however, wanted more and saw huge potential in the broadband Internet
industry. Unfortunately for Enron, this venture, unlike many of its others, produced
losses that could not be hidden using off balance sheet financing. Enron had the goal of
widely trading broadband capacity, much like many of its _commodity contracts.
However, this time the company faced fierce competition in the market from large

_L
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telecommunications companies, and the market move resulted in Enron losing millions of
dollars. Enron was even accused of making a "sham" trade with Qwest, another
broadband company to make the broadband market not look as bad and to hide some of
its losses. Essentially, this transaction was a swap of broadband capacity between the
companies that was valued at $500 million, and thus no real money was made on the
transaction (Fusaro 89).
The broadband fiasco, coupled with a failed power venture in India that lost
billions, and the California energy crisis resulted in Enron amassing substantial losses.
As Professor Harold Bierman of the Johnson School of Management at Cornell
University stated, "If a firm loses a billion here and a billion there, pretty soon it
becomes material" (Fusaro 106). Investors, seeing substantial losses in the company,
began to lose confidence in it. Articles such as "Is Enron Overpriced" did not help the
company's situation by revealing facts showing that the company's financials lacked
transparency and that Enron stock traded at almost 55 times its annual earnings, more
than double the industry average (McLean 2, 122). In 2001 , analysts became even more
skeptical of the company when Enron was late in publicly reporting its financials.
Revenues were often shown as increasing, but costs were also shown to be increasing in
amounts that surpassed the corresponding increase in revenues. When Enron filed its
form 10-Q with the SEC on August 14, 2001, a more accurate state of affairs at Enron
came to light. Net income was reported at $829 million, while its cash lost from
operating activities increased to over $1.3 billion (Enron). The once mighty company
was failing with heavy outflows of cash without an offsetting inflow. That day Skilling
suddenly resigned as CEO ofEnron and Ken Lay took back the position ("A Star" 2).

l...
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The next day, an Enron employee sent Ken Lay a seven page memo laying out her
concerns about the company that would reveal the fraud that was occurring behind the
1

scenes using "creative" accounting. On October 16 h, 2001 Enron released its third
quarter results and posted a $1.01 billion write-down "to reflect the deteriorating
conditions of many of its businesses, especially the broadband communications
business," resulting in a third quarter loss of$618 million (Fusaro 116). A part ofthis
billion dollar write down was a $35 million charge to an SPE called LJM Capital
management run by CFO Andrew Fastow. Enron's stock price quickly became a shadow
of its former self, and with the drop in its stock prices so too did its ability to be an active
trader in the markets that it created. Since Enron mostly pledged its own stock as
collateral for the transactions in which the company was involved, the falling price made
their collateral worthless to their trading partners. Without the proper collateral for the
trades, Enron's ability to trade in markets was crushed. As Enron's stock price
plummeted on its way to below $ 1 per share, the company filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.
The company' s employees took the fall ofEnron extremely hard. With over $1.3
billion of the $2.1 billion in assets ofEnron's 401(K) plan invested in Enron stock,
retirement plans were wiped out with many of them invested solely in Enron stock.
Some ofthese plans were even valued at over $1 million dollars before the collapse (Fox
290), and as the price of Enron stock fell, employees were unable to sell the shares of
Enron in their retirement accounts while Enron executives sold theirs (ERISA).
The house of cards that Enron had built crumbled, taking with it billions of dollars
in investors' money, as well as numerous jobs, and even employees' life savings.
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January of2002 proved to be an interesting time in the Enron saga. It was a time when
much of the scandal started to come to light. Sherron Watkins, vice president for
corporate development at Enron, was the one who wrote the anonymous memo to Ken
Lay back in August 2001 expressing her fear that she was "incredibly nervous that we
[Enron] will implode in a wave of accounting scandals" (Fusaro 125). Implode, the
company had, and with it so did Enron's external auditing firm Arthur Andersen. The
head of Arthur Andersen's Houston engagement team for Enron, David Duncan was
disciplined and ultimately dismissed by the firm for ordering the destruction of Enron
related documents, some of which were subpoenaed by the SEC (Fox 271, 272, 296).
The firm's reputation was ruined and now has been completely disbanded for all intents
and purposes.
Enron was ultimately involved in many different special purpose entities that
paved the way for disaster at the company. One of these entities, Chewco (so named
after the Star Wars character Chewbacca since Fastow was an avid Star Wars fan) skirted
the proper rules for the accounting of special purpose entities. The entity was created to
buy out CalPERS equity in another one ofEnron's special purpose entities, the Joint
Energy Development Investments deal or JEDI (another Star Wars reference). The
problem with Chewco was the fact that it was ultimately created and owned by Enron,
with no other company having the three percent interest in the entity to allow it to not be
reported on Enron's financials. In addition, c;hewco never received board approval from
Enron to be created and led by Michael Kopper (Fox 123). One of the next major SPEs
created by Fastow was called LJM and was named after his wife Lea and his two children
by using their first initials. This entity was essentially created to insure Enron' s holdings
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in Rhythms NetCommunications, an Internet service provider, from loss in va1ue since

Enron was using the mark-to-market accounting system. Enron had looked around for
other companies to provide this service, but because of the risky nature of Rhythm's
stock, Enron could not come to an agreed amount on the insured value of the stock.
Therefore, Fastow set up LJM to essentially self insure Enron's holdings while making it
appear that an outside entity was actually insuring the stock. Essentially this entity, while
still not reported on Enron's books despite the lack of three percent ownership by an
outside entity, was created to provide a hedge from potential future loss in value of
Enron's stock (Fox 150-151 ).
It was the creation of LJM2 that created one of the most significant financial

statement frauds on Enron's books. The LJM2 SPE was used in a similar fashion to LJM
and the Rhythms stock deal, but this time it was far more complex and deceiving. The
major deals involved with LJM2 involved what were called the four " Raptors," named
after the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park. These Raptors were used to bury the losses of
unprofitable investments, ultimately hiding $1.1 billion in losses from the financial
statements ofEnron (Fusaro 135). Furthermore, throughout all of these SPEs and
transactions, Andrew Fastow was able to abscond with nearly $45 million (131) landing

him in prison.
Enron, however, was the first in a long string of financial statement frauds that
swept the United States in 2001 and 2002. On the heels of the financial disaster at Enron
came the revelation of fraud at WorldCom, the largest accounting fraud in United States
history (Scharff). Unlike Enron's complex system of partnerships, special purpose
entities, and revenue recognition methods, the fraud that took place at WorldCom was

...
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much more straightforward. The bulk of the fraud involved the capitalization of
operating expenses, allowing the company to essentially remove these expenses from the
company's income statement fraudulently increasing the company's bottom line and
assets ("Drawing").

WorldCom
WorldCom was the second largest telecom company in the United States handling
half of the Internet traffic in the U.S. and half of all e-mails worldwide, while also
serving over 20 million customers ("The WorldCom Fraud"). The company was lead by
CEO Bernard Ebbers with Scott Sullivan as the company CFO. Ebbers placed significant
importance to the continuing growth of the company and the meeting of the financial
projections given to Wall Street. In the late 1990' s, WorldCom, as a part of this strategy,
acquired over sixty companies. These acquisitions, while allowing WorldCom to grow in
size and increase its assets, also created significant liabilities for the company. When
financial objectives were in danger of not being met due to these liabilities, WorldCom
used reserve accounts to fraudulently cover up the liabilities of these acquisitions by
reducing various reserve accounts using improper journal entries. In doing this,
WorldCom was able to add $2.8 billion dollars to the company's revenues. When the
reserves were not enough to reduce liabilities to improve the appearance of the
company's financial situation, misclassification of expenses as capitalized costs was then
practiced. Ebbers, continuing to focus on achieving the projections expected by Wall
Street, instructed Chief Financial Officer Scott Sullivan to essentially take whatever
means necessary to achieve the numbers. Sullivan acted by having the WorldCom

~
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accountants take $3.85 billion in operating expenses over more than a year and classify
them as assets. This reclassification allowed WorldCom to turn losses into profits. ("The
WorldCom Fraud"). During the trial of Ebbers for his role in the fraud, former
WorldCom accountants testified that they were forced to create these false entries, with
some ofthem valued at over $700 million in just one quarter. ("Ex-WorldCom," C6).
In 2002, Cindy Cooper was largely credited for blowing the whistle on the fraud
at WorldCom. As a part of the internal audit team at WorldCom, she and her team found
that $500 million in computer expenses were recorded as assets, in addition to over $2
billion in unauthorized capital expenditures and questionable accounting entries ("The
WorldCom Fraud"). When Cooper asked to see the documents supporting these
transactions, they could not be found, and subsequently on June 25, 2002 WorldCom
announced that it had "inflated profits by $3.8 billion over the previous five quarters"
("The WorldCom Fraud"). Less than one month later, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy,
making it the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history with over $107 billion in assets.
Ultimately, it was discovered that the fraud that had taken place at WorldCom was valued
at $11 billion and both Ebbers and Sullivan were found guilty for their roles in crafting
WorldCom's financial statement fraud.

Tyco and Adelphia
While the frauds at Enron and WorldCom were the largest financial statement
frauds in the U.S., they were by no means the only ones. Significant frauds also took
place at Tyco and Adelphia Comrriunications Corporation among others. In the fraud that
took place at Tyco, CEO Dennis Kozlowski and other executives of the company were
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able to steal $600 million through unauthorized loans and bonuses and in doing so
Kozlowski embodied the definition of corporate excess. He used company money to pay
for half of a $2.1 million trip to the Italian island of Sardinia to celebrate his wife's
birthday. Also on the company's tab was $11 million to furnish his New York City
apartment with art and antiques. To appease investors, Tyco executives heavily used
aggressive accounting practices to inflate the financials of the company in direct
opposition to the conservatism principle of GAAP accounting. The company recognized
more than $26 million in goodwill on its balance sheet to increase earnings by not having
to recognize related costs of the corporate acquisitions that created this goodwill.
Furthermore, Tyco failed to recognize $8 billion in acquisitions of more than 700 entities
by claiming that each acquisition was immaterial to the company. However, when taken
as a whole, these represent material amounts that should have been reported in the
company's fmancials. (Biegelmen 12-13).
The fraud at Adelphia, the United States' sixth largest cable provider had many of
the same features as that ofTyco ' s fraud with CEO John Rigas using Adelphia's accounts
as his family's "personal piggy bank" (Biegelmen 16). He and his sons used the company
to finance the construction of a $13 million private golf course and also to receive secret
cash payments of one million dollars a month, among other excesses including loans and
personal use of corporate jets. In all, he and his sons used over $1 billion from the
company to fund such personal expenditures. None of these expenses appeared on the
financial statements of Adelphia, however. According to James R. Brown, a former Vice
President ofFinance for Adelphia, the company kept two sets of books for over 10 years,
one containing the fraudulent numbers and one with the actual status of the company
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(Biegelmen 17). More than $2.3 billion in loans had been provided to the Rigas family to
support their extravagant lifestyle and fuel their fraud (Biegelmen 16).

Chapter 2- Why Do Financial Statement Frauds Occur?
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia are just a few of the examples of what can
and does go wrong in corporate America when dishonest individuals are presented with
the opportunity to commit fraud. The fraud triangle below presents a model that helps to
describe why financial statement fraud occurs, and it shows that such fraud is often a
result of the combination of the pressure placed on both the company and its
management, the opportunity to commit fraud, and the ability to rationalize fraudulent
actions (Harfenist). When all these factors come together, they have the potential to
create and have created some of the world's largest cases of financial statement fraud.

Pressure

Fraud
Triangle
Opportunity

Rationalization
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Qpportunity: Too Complex?
The job of an accountant can be a daunting one. There are countless pages of
standards that are issued by various regulatory bodies that one must understand and know
how to apply correctly. In addition, the accounting industry is constantly changing,
issuing new standards and revising old standards to keep up with economic changes.
Some ofthe principles and standards can be relatively easy to apply while others are
significantly more complex, resulting in only expert accountants knowing how to apply
them. The complex nature of some of these topics can be a gateway to fmancial statement
fraud. Because accounting topics such as special purpose entities (SPEs), revenue
recognition, and the accounting for leases and pensions can be extremely complicated,
the accountants who fully understand how to apply them are in a position of power when
it comes to formulating fmancial statements, especially since few people beyond
accountants understand these principles. Furthermore, financial statement fraud rarely
occurs by using just one technique. Frequently, complex accounting issues are combined
in various ways to create the earnings desired by management. By using such
complicated topics and those with some latitude with their application, savvy accountants
are able to take the opportunity to produce fraudulent fmancial statements that, on the
surface, appear to accurately portray the situation of the company.

• Revenue Recognition
Take revenue recognition, for example. While this topic is nowhere near as
· complex as those to be discussed concerning SPEs, there is enough leeway in the proper
recognition of revenue for a company that it is relatively easy to be "adjusted" to fit the
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desires of a company's mau1agement. This form of "earnings mau1agement" using
improper revenue recognition by overstating revenue occurs frequently. According to a
2002 report by the United States General Accounting Office [GAO], 38% of the
investigated restatements involved revenue recognition issues (GAO), and it is the most
frequent cause of restatements of a compau1y's finau1cials (C:heney). The official stance of
the Financial Accounting Stau1dards Board [FASB] on the recognition of revenues in a
company's books is that the revenue arising from the transaction must be both earned and
realized or realizable. However, the ambiguity of these two conditions leaves open a
whole host of opportunities for companies to recognize revenue that, in substance, meets
neither of these qualifications. In addition, there is also guidance provided by the FASB' s
Emerging Issues Task Force and the SEC Various industries also have diverse ways of
accounting for revenue, adding to the confusion. While errors in the correct revenue
recognition can stem from obvious confusion regarding what rules au1d standards are
applicable to their specific company, this confusion opens the door to fraud (C:heney).
To determine whether revenue should be recognized, some basic questions can be
asked of management to determine the proper treatment of the trau1saction in mau1y cases:
1. "Has delivery occurred (and title passed) or in the case of service industries,
have services been rendered (earned)?
2. Is the price fixed or determinable?
3. Have we been paid or are we reasonably assured of payment" (realized or
realizable)? (Darazasdi)
Nevertheless, mau1agement can or will find different ways of overstating their
revenues. When revenue recognition is involved in a company's fmancial statement
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fraud, several different schemes can be or are used, including bill and hold sales
transactions, side agreements, conditional sales, improper recognition of consignment
sales as completed sales, unauthorized shipments, and illegitimate cutoff of sales
transactions at the end of the reporting period (Rezaee 6). These tactics directly violate
GAAP accounting principles. In a bill and hold transaction, the company that makes a
sale will bill the customer for the goods and credit revenues despite physically not
shipping the goods to the consumer. For example, a company may sell goods to a
customer long before the customer would typically purchase them and instead of shipping
the goods to that customer, the seller would simply continue to hold the goods. In
substance, no complete transaction has taken place and the recognition of revenue is
simply to boost short-term revenues in the current period (Martin).
Side agreements and conditional sales, as well as improper recording of
consignment sales can further distort a company' s true revenues. Side agreements and
conditional sales occur by offering special privileges to customers. For example, a
customer may be sold merchandise, but they will not have to pay for it until certain
conditions occur such as the customer reselling the goods. This jeopardizes the realized
or realizable requirement of revenue recognition because if the goods are never sold, they
are never paid for. Sales on consignment can also easily be used to overstate revenue of a
company. By placing goods on consignment the consignor retains title to the goods until
they are sold and cannot record any sale or revenue until after they are sold by the
consignee. However, to increase the apparent revenues of their bottom line, companies
record the revenues associated with the consigned goods as soon as they are handed over
to the consignee rather than waiting for the goods to be sold.

l

Christian 20
Other companies may engage in improper cutoff procedures in which they record
revenue from sales and contracts in the period prior to when it should actually be
recognized. Often, the transaction creating the revenue is not complete at the time of
recognition and is completed shortly after the end of the period, similar to a bill and hold
transaction. For example, a company may sell a product to a customer at the end of a
current period, but not actually ship it until the following period. However, they still go
ahead and book the revenue in the current period, over-inflating the company 's revenue
for the period recognized. Companies engage in some or all of these fraudulent practices
to appear to meet earnings estimates and boost apparent profitability.

•

Improper Expense Capitalization
Along with problems with revenue recognition and fraudulent practices to

recognize revenue before it is allowable, companies can also engage in improper expense
capitalization to increase their bottom line. Capitalization is essentially the recording of
expenses as assets that will be depreciated over the useful life of the item obtained
through the expense. When expenses are recorded as assets, they do not flow through the
income statement in the financial reporting process, rather, they are a transfer of assets
from one form to another or a creation of an asset with on offsetting liability. An expense
is not recorded and therefore net income of the company is not reduced by the
corresponding amount. These expenses are spread out over several years through
depreciating the newly formed assets. WorldCom made this type of fraud famous with its
capitalization of $3.8 billion in operating expenses, significantly overstating the income
of the company by allowing these expenses to avoid the company's income statement. ·
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Upon correct treatment of these expenses, as previously discussed, the restatement turned
a billion dollar profit in 2001 into a loss. The perpetration of fraud using improper
capitalization of expenses, however, is much more straight forward compared to the use
of leases to hide company debt.

•

Lease Accounting
The complexity associated with accounting for leases presents another significant

opportunity for financial statement fraud. FASB Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 13 provides the authoritative guidance on how to properly account for
leases. However, loopholes in this standard enable companies to design leases in such a
way that significant liabilities of the company are able to be concealed depending on the
classification of the lease. Leases can be classified as either operating leases or capital
leases. Operating leases are essentially rentals whose accounting consists of simply
recognizing the rental expense related to the lease in each period with either a cash
payment or a current liability when a payment is due and no asset or long-term liability
recognized for the transaction. These relatively simple transactions, however, can present
some challenges for companies and their auditors alike, resulting in many financial
restatements due to their improper accounting. Determining the proper amortization
period for leasehold improvements, accounting for free rent, as well as the accounting for
landlord improvements are all complicated issues that have led to improper accounting on
company fmancial statements (Fornaro).
Capital leases, on the other hand, are even more complex in their recognition
because in substance they are "really purchases of the propetty" where "the lease contract
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serves merely as a legal mechanism by which the transaction is effected" (Ketz 73).
These leases are to be accounted for as if they were purchased outright by the lessee
recognizing both the asset and the associated liability of the purchase in their accounting
records. It is this recognition of the liability that management wants to avoid in
accounting for the lease and management will work hard to do so. To be classified as a
capital lease the lease must meet at least one of the following criteria:

1. "The lease transfers ownership of the property to the lessee by the end of the
lease term.
2. The lease contains a bargain purchase option.

3. The lease term is equal to 75 percent or more of the estimated economic life
of the leased property.
4. The present value at the beginning of the lease term of the minimum lease
payments excluding that portion of the payments representing executory costs
such as insurance, maintenance, and taxes to be paid by the lessor, including
any profit thereon, equals or exceeds 90 percent of the excess of the fair value
of the leased property to the lessor at the inception of the lease over any
related investment tax credit retained by the lessor and expected to be realized
by him." (SFAS No. 13)
While it seems that the above criteria clearly state what qualifies as a capital
lease, the criteria are not sufficiently comprehensive to cover all leases that are in
substance capital leases. A savvy accountant or lawyer can design a lease contract so that
the lease meets none of these criteria, despite it being a long-term lease. Long-term leases
can be written so that the present value of minimum lease payments equals only 89.9
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percent of the fair value. This practice is obviously trying to skirt the substance oft~e
lease by altering its form and misleading investors from the true nature of the transaction
by not placing the asset or liability on the company' s books, hiding the true debt and
obligations of the company from its investors and creditors.
In order to write a lease that will not meet any of the criteria for being classified
as a capital lease, there are many routes that the lease writer can take. The first three
criteria of capital leases are fairly easy to circumvent in writing the lease agreement. The
lease will not transfer ownership to the lessee, will not contain a bargain purchase option
upon the end of the term, and the lease will not be for longer than 75 percent of the useful
life of the property. However, it is the present value criterion that is the most

difficul~

to

avoid, but a knowledgeable accountant will find ways around it.
The rate at which the cash flows are discounted at when performing the 90
percent test can affect whether or not this criterion is met. When·determining what type
of lease to classify the agreement as, the rate used to discount the minimum lease
payments is dependent on whether the implicit rate of return set by the lessor is known to
the lessee. If the rate is unknown to the lessee, the lessee uses their incremental
borrowing rate to discount the payments. SFAS No. 19 states that the lower of the
incremental rate of return or the borrower's incremental borrowing rate should be used
when the incremental rate is known to the lessee. However, because of the nature of
present value calculations, a higher discounting rate will produce a smaller total present
value for the payments. Because of this, if the lessee expects that the incremental rate of
return is lower than their borrowing rate, the lessee may request that the lessor not inform
them ofthe incremental rate and just simply use the higher bon-owing rate to discount the
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proper cash flows, thus reducing the percentage of fair value and a greater chance of
coming in under the 90 percent rule (Ketz 90).
The method in which residual value is considered in the lease can also influence
how the lease is accounted for. When the residual value of the property is guaranteed,
where the lessee must either return the "property with a value at or greater than the
residual value or it must pay for any deficiencies" (Ketz 91), the value is considered to be
part of the minimum lease payments for the property and thus included in the 90 percent
test. However, if the same residual value is not guaranteed, it does not have to be
included in the present value of minimum payments calculation, making it easier to fall
below 90 percent of the fair value. Another, yet similar, way to circumvent the test is to
use contingent rental fees, such as a percentage of sales to pay rent rather than a fixed
amount. Contingent fees such as these do not have to be included in the present value of
minimum lease payments calculations, substantially reducing the present value of the
cash flows associated in determining the nature of the lease (Ketz 91). These are just
some of the major ways that companies are able to "adjust" leases to fit the profile that
they want and yet remain within the strict letter of the law, but essentially fraudulently
portray their situation to creditors and investors or following the underlying principles of
the accounting standards.

•

Special Purpose Entities (SPEs)
In a similar relationship to leases, special purpose entities can be used to

significantly mislead investors and creditors about the financial situation of a company.
Special purpose entities can take any organizational form and are created by a company
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to fulfill a specia1 or limited purpose. Companies can use SPEs for "selling or transferring
assets to the SPE, all sorts of leasing activities, borrowing money, issuing one type of
equity to the SPE that is converted into another type of security, creating research and
development vehicles, and as hedging devices" (Ketz 126). This type of relationship
between company and SPE was made infamous by the fraudulent actions taken by Enron
in hiding billions in corporate debt as previously discussed in chapter one.
SPEs are not entirely fraudulent and do serve legitimate business purposes.
Through sheltering the risk of investments, they allow firms involved with an SPE to
obtain credit at a cheaper price through lower interest rates. Also, SPEs can be used to
reduce the tax liability of a company in creating synthetic leases between the company
and the SPE. A synthetic lease allows a company to account for a lease with a SPE as an
operating lease for financial reporting purposes, but can account for it as a capital lease
for tax purposes. By accounting for it as a capital lease for tax purposes, a company is
allowed to deduct depreciation expense from their income and thus reduce their tax
liability.
However, it is the fraudulent use of SPEs that are of most concern to investors and
creditors and that result in. significant problems. One of the leading problems with SPEs
is the view of management that they do not have to include the SPE on the balance sheet
of their company, resulting in a way of hiding significant liabilities from the public. Just
as SPEs cannot be created for the sole purpose of avoiding taxes without punishment, so
too SPEs cannot be setup for the sole purpose of misrepresenting liabilities on the balance
sheet (Ketz 130).
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One of the primary ways of avoiding these liabilities on the balance sheet occurs
in using SPEs as the channel to conduct securitizations and by creating synthetic leases.
In a securitization, the SPE acts as an issuer of asset-backed securities to investors. Cash

from these transactions flows back to the primary business entity, while the SPE uses the
assets contributed to it by the primary business to pay back the investors. The amount of
continuing control over the assets contributed to the SPE by the issuing firm plays an
important part in whether or not the company must report the liabilities.ofthe SPE on
their balance sheets. According to F ASB Statement 140, "if the firm severs all control
and all residual interest in the assets, then it can recognize the gain or loss on the transfer
of the assets to the SPE, and significantly, the business entity does not recognize any of
the liabilities" (Ketz 134).
The accounting for contingent liabilities is also a significant factor in dealing with
SPEs. In the event that the SPE defaults on its obligations, the extent to which the
business entity is liable is a factor that must also be considered when reporting the
business's contingent liabilities. If the possibility of default and the related liability is
remote then no mention of the liability needs to be placed in the business's fmancial
statements. When that same contingency is probable and estimable, then the liability must
be disclosed and the related deduction must be taken on the income statement. If the
probable contingency is not estimable or is only reasonably possible, the effect should be
clearly disclosed in the notes to the financials and explain why the amount is not
estimable if the loss is probable (Ketz 134). On the other hand, in keeping with the
conservatism principle of basic accounting, gain contingencies are never recognized.
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In addition to the issues associated with the securitizations, SPEs can also be used
to engage in synthetic leases. As mentioned earlier, these leases allow businesses to
obtain the tax benefits of a capital lease by lowering their tax liability, while still being
able to treat the lease as an operating lease for purposes of financial reporting. Synthetic
leases enable companies to conceal billions of dollars in liabilities from those relying on
their financial information. Part of this concealment is evidenced in the disclosures of the
leases themselves in the notes to the financial statements. These disclosures often are
constructed in ways in which the average reader and even some of the most advanced
readers will not be able to discern the true nature of the liability of the business.
The formation of a synthetic lease is a rather complicated process. In a similar
fashion to the securitizations, the SPE issues asset backed securities to investors in return
for cash. The cash received is subsequently used by the SPE to purchase/lease by way of
a note/contract some type of capital asset. The capital asset is then leased to the business
using the methods described above to crea,te a lease that will be recognized as an
operating lease on the company's books, often times with a third party guaranteeing the
residual value of the lease in order to lower the present value of the minimum lease
payments. The business then makes lease payments to the SPE where the SPE then uses
this to repay the investors of the SPE both their principal and interest (Ketz 137-138).
Despite these liabilities, why is it that the business entities creating these special
purpose entities do not have to recognize the liabilities of the SPEs on their financial
statements? In the U.S. it is estimated that there are trillions of dollars in debt hidden
from the public due to the use of SPEs in securitization and synthetic leases. The primary
reason for this occurrence deals with the rules on consolidating SPEs into the financials
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of the business entity. Pre-Enron it was very easy for a company to get around
consolidating the assets and especially the liabilities with their own.
Originally, the business enterprise "did not have to consolidate the assets and
liabilities of the SPE as long as the equity interest of a third party owner was at least three
percent of the SPE' s total capitalization" (Soroosh 33). This rule easily allowed the
business entity to avoid consolidation of the debts of the SPE with the business 's
financial statements, creating an easy work around for businesses to deceive investors
about the true nature of the relationship with the SPE. By creating relationships such as
these to avoid reporting liabilities on its balance sheet, the business is more concerned
with the form ofthe transaction rather than the true substance that is emphasized by basic
accounting principles. Because of the accounting complexities, largely subjective
application of the rules, and management's desire to make the company look more
appealing to investors and creditors, SPEs were and are a vehicle of choice for hiding
significant debt from a company's financials.

•

Accounting for Pensions
In addition to SPEs, the way in which a company accounts for the pension plans

of its employees is another area in accounting that is quite complex and filled with ways
for management to hide obligations of the company. While many of the actions regarding
pension accounts are not fraudulent in nature, they do present ways for management to
mislead investors regarding the state of a company's financials to the complex nature of
accounting for and reporting pension obligations.
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Much like leases, the type of pension plan that a company uses plays a significant
role in whether or not it will be able to conceal the obligations of the pension from those
reading the company's balance sheet. The two major types of pension plans include
defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans. The defined contribution plans are
much more straightforward to account for than the defined benefit plans because they
consist ofthe company's promise to contribute a certain amount of money to the
company's pension fund as stated in the company's pension agreement with their
employees. When recording this contribution by the employer on their accounting
records, the accountant simply determines the amount to be contributed and records the
short term payable and the corresponding expense followed by recording the subsequent
cash outflow when the payable is paid to the pension fund. No long-term obligation exists
with this type of pension plan, with the risk of future payment " resting with how the
market performs to determine how employees are paid after retirement" (Ketz).
The defined benefit plan, however, is much more complicated to account for and
presents the opportunity for management to hide significant liabilities from the readers of
its financial statements. In this plan, the employer promises the employee future
compensation after retirement based on many factors including salary level and time with
the company. The employer has no set contribution to the plan aside from those required
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA] (Ketz 107), however the
employer bears the risk of providing employees with their promised benefits. If the
pension fund to which the employer contributes falls short of its projected value, the
employer must still provide the funds to pay out the promised benefits to the retired
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employees. Measuring the liability of the company to provide these future benefits is the
major problem with this type of plan (Apostolou 2).
There are many items that make up a pension and its obligations to the company.
The service cost is "the actuarial present value of projected benefits earned by employees
in the current accounting period" (Apostolou 2). The projected benefit obligation or PBO
measures the defened compensation amount for employees at the present value of their
future salaries (Kieso 1023). This amount is the cumulative liability the company has
promised to the employee, whereas the service cost is just the impact on the pension
commitment from the employee working one more year. Interest costs associated with
the PBO also add to the cost of the pension. The plan assets in the pension fund are
invested to earn money, called the expected return on plan assets. The net pension cost
includes the service costs plus the interest costs, less any expected return on plan assets.
This amount, the net pension cost, is what is reported on the income statement of a
company. Prepaid pension costs or accrued pension liabilities are made up of the prior
year's balance plus any funds contributed during the cunent year minus the net pension
cost. The prepaid pension cost or accrued pension liability are the only other accounts
reported on the face of the financial statements, with their components listed in the
footnote disclosures.
Prior service costs are also a factor in the overall liability of a company's pension
plan. These costs consist of benefits allocated to employees for their years at the
company prior to it having a pension plan. The present value of these future costs
becomes the initial PBO for the beginning of the year. However, despite the fact that
these costs could potentially be very significant to the accounts of the enterprise, the

Christian 31

FASB currently allows companies to spread these costs out over time through
amortization (Apostolou 3). Because the entire amount is not recognized in full at the
time it is incurred, the remaining balance of the prior service cost, a liability for the
company, is hidden from investors and creditors and does not portray an accurate view of
the financial state of the company.
Furthermore, the fact that the net pension cost reported on the company' s income
statement is partially based on expected returns on plan assets rather than the actual
returns leaves room for executives to manage the company's financials by overstating the
expected returns. The difference between the expected return and the actual return is
recognized as a gain or loss for the company. However, the company is allowed to spread
the gain or loss over an extended period of time allowing the company to conceal any
losses experienced by the company with regards to its pension plan. Also, current
practice allows companies to net their projected benefit obligation with their plan assets
and report the difference to show the funded or unfunded status of the pension plan.
However, management is able to remove assets from the pension account, resulting in the
fact that just because it is funded one year, does not mean that the assets will be there
funding the pension account the following year (Ketz 117).
Another way for management to adjust the image of the company' s pension plan
lies with the interest rates used for key calculations, such as discounting the projected
benefit obligation and calculating the expected return on plan assets. Similar in nature to
the lease transactions, the higher the rate used to discount the PBO, the smaller the
resulting obligation will be. On the other hand, the higher rate also results in higher
interest expense for the company, slightly offsetting the benefits of using an increased
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rate. When using a higher rate for the expected return on plan assets, it leads to a lower
accrued pension liability and decreases the net pension cost that is reported on the income
statement. Ketz correctly states that "given the huge amounts of money that are involved
in pensions, it behooves the investment community to obtain a right understanding of
what pension accounting is about" (122). The complex issues presented in accounting for
pensions as well as revenue recognition, lease accounting, and special purpose entities,
provide ample opportunity for management to "engineer earnings" and make the
company appear to be in a different financial situation than what the financial statements
suggest.

•

Related Party Transactions
Opportunity to commit financial statement fraud does not only exist from highly

complex transactions. Significant related party transactions also provide the chance for
management to commit fraud, especially since the parties that are often times involved
with the transactions are highly ranked in the organization, allowing them to override any
controls to prevent fraud of this type as was seen in the frauds at Tyco and Adelphia.
Additionally, the significant use of estimates can also contribute to the opportunity to
commit fraud (Harfenist). By their very nature, estimated numbers in accounts, whether
they are interest rates or estimated account balan~es, present an opportunity to commit
fraud due to the fact that these numbers are not drawn from concrete sources. Significant
judgment on the part of management is required in establishing these figures. With the
state of the accounting industry today, there is ample opportunity to commit financial
statement fraud. Faced with this opportunity, an honest executive may even find
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themselves considering fraudulent actions when faced with added pressure and
rationalization making the recent push towards corporate social responsibility even more
important.

Pressure and Rationalization: Corporate Culture
The two remaining points on the fraud triangle, pressure and rationalization, also
play important roles in management's decision to commit fmancial statement fraud. The
pressure associated with committing fraud stems from both internal and external forces
on management and its company. Corrupt corporate governance is one internal factor that
can significantly lead to fmancial statement fraud and place pressure on management.
When the "tone at the top" is corrupt and does not set an example for the employees
below, the firm is more likely to engage in fraudulent activities, especially top
management. "A majority of financial statement frauds occur with participation,
encouragement, approval, and knowledge of top management teams including CEOs,
CFOs, presidents, treasurers, and controllers" (Rezaee). A lack of effective monitoring by
the company's board of directors also plays a major role in the occurrence of financial
statement fraud at a company and maintaining a proper ethical tone. This tone at the top
should demand high quality fmancial reporting with a zero tolerance policy for anything
less.
Other factors that can influence management to commit fraud include outright
greed and management's compensation plans. When management's bonuses and
compensation are tied to the performance of the company as depicted in the financial
statements, it creates a greater incentive to "adjust the numbers" in the financials to meet
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the threshold that yields a higher salary or bonus. Furthermore, employees working at the
company may feel a sense of entitlement to higher compensation for perceiving
themselves to be worth more than they are being paid for their efforts in an attempt to
rationalize their fraud. Related party transactions and executive perquisites can also be
rationalized through entitlement. For example, a loan to a related party with no
anticipation of repayment is not a loan in substance at all and should not be reported as a
receivable on the company's books. It is effectively additional compensation and should
be recognized as such instead of falsely represented as an asset.
When it came to meeting expectations, the culture at Enron was almost a textbook
case in the breakdown of corporate ethics and management's overzealous desire to grow
the company to meet expectations set by Wall Street analysts. It didn't matter to CFO Jeff
Skilling how things at Enron were done as long as they reported that they made money.
Executives were abusive and highly controlling towards those below them (McLean), but
as long as they could bring in the profits, Skilling was comfortable with their tactics.

Many of the trading deals conducted at the company were done in the best interest of
individual employees rather than deals that benefited the entire firm. Lavish bonuses
were paid out to those who could bring in large profits on trades, and other employees
had no problems taking these deals from their colleagues. Having an ethical tone at the
top and monitoring and reviewing employees' decisions for ethical behavior are essential
to avoiding fmancial statement fraud.
In addition to corporate governance issues, pressure and rationalization to commit
fraud also largely stem from external factors related to the company. Economic pressures
from Wall Street coupled with the poor corporate governance discussed earlier are likely
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the single most significant factors causing financial statement fraud. In the U.S. economy,
companies are rewarded for continued growth. Record breaking growth is awarded with
record stock prices and earnings, but once that growth begins to slow, the company is
often punished severely by investors with falling stock prices. This pressure to perform is
the catalyst that often drives financial statement fraud. When a company is not
performing to meet the earnings estimates made by Wall Street analysts, financial
statement fraud seems like an easy way to avoid a drop in stock price or rating. There is
also pressure by management to use any creative accounting tactic available to make the
company appear to be better than others in their industry and in the market in general. By
not taking aggressive accounting measures to ensure a good image, others in the market
may take these questionable routes, channeling investors' capital towards the firms using
such aggressive measures. For example, a company that knows how to structure
accounting for leases and pensions in such a manner that significant liabilities do not
appear on their balance sheets would look to be in a better financial position than those
companies who do not know these methods.
Also, being able to obtain credit at the lowest possible prices or even simply being
able to obtain it at all are influential factors in whether fraud may occur at a company.
Often specific debt covenants are set by creditors and banks that must be met in order to

'
maintain creditworthiness at the institution. When in danger of defaulting on these
covenants, financial statement fraud may be viewed as the only route to take rather than
risk violating debt covenants and the associated loss of financing.
Even the auditors of companies face pressure and rationalization in contributing
to financial statement fraud. Before the legislative actions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
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zooz, which will be discussed in the following section, a significant part of the fees that
auditors received were from non-audit related services. When discovering
inconsistencies, material weaknesses, and misstatements in their client's internal control
and financial reporting processes, auditors may have felt pressured to not report or ignore
their fmdings. In reporting these findings or resigning from the engagement, not only
would the firm lose their future audit fees from the client, but they would lose millions in
current and future consulting fees from these non-attestation services. These fees in many
cases equated to more than the revenues received from performing the company's audit.
Not only would the auditors feel pressured from losing the revenue from the client, they
also would be pressured from the client's top management to issue an unqualified opinion
on the company's financial statements. If management did not receive the unqualified
opinion from their auditors, they would likely find another audit firm that would provide
this opinion, further adding to the rationalization of simply issuing the clean opinion and
keeping the client as well as the associated revenue rather than losing it to another audit
firm.

Chapter 3 -What Has Been Done to Stop Financial Statement Fraud?
When top management is presented with the right opportunity, some pressure
from both inside and outside of the company, and the ability to rationalize their actions,
devastating financial statement fraud may occur. After the string of frauds in 2001, many
agencies have taken action in passing a variety of legislation and new accounting
standards to help prevent future frauds, especially catastrophic frauds such as those at
Enron and World Com. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, FASB Interpretation 46R, and
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Statements of Auditing Standards 99 have all been implemented to help improve
financial reporting and reduce the opportunity for financial statement fraud.

fuirbanes Oxley Act of2002
Shortly after the frauds at Enron and WorldCom resulted in significant negative
consequences on the stock market, employees, and corporate shareholders, Congress took
action in the form ofthe Sarbanes Oxley Act of2002. This act takes extensive measures
to try to prevent future corporate scandals and corruption. These measures are so
pervasive in reforming financial auditing and reporting controls of public companies
that some have called this piece of legislation the "largest piece of business legislation
since FDR's New Deal" (Miller).
The ultimate purpose of the Sarbanes Oxley legislation is to restore the
confidence of investors in corporate America by "creating a public-company accountingoversight board, revising auditor independence rules, revising corporate governance
standards, and significantly increasing the criminal penalties for violations of securities
laws" (Miller). In trying to eliminate avenues for corruption and false financial reporting,
Congress hopes that investors will have more confidence in the financial data that
companies present, leading to greater investment in companies that are truly performing
well and not just performing well on paper based on fraudulent information.
In order to accomplish these goals, the Sarbanes Oxley Act establishes many
provisions, one of which is the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board [PCAOB], an organization made up of five members chosen by the SEC, with at
least two ofthe members being, or having been, CPAs. The PCAOB has many
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responsibilities including the registering of public accounting firms and conducting
inspections of accounting firms. These inspections and registrations help to provide one
more level of protection in ensuring that the firms auditing public companies comply
with certain standards and audit practices. In addition, it must "establish, or adopt by rule,
'auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
preparation of audit reports for issuers,' and enforce compliance with the Act [Sarbanes
Oxley], the rules of the Board, professional standards, and the securities laws relating to
the preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of
accountants" (AICPA Summary). Furthe1more, it is the audit firm' s duty to cooperate
with standard-setting groups and to apply or amend standards appropriately.
When it comes to the effect of Sarbanes Oxley on management and fmancial
reporting, internal controls is the area of greatest concern. Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley
states that it is "the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an
adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting," as well as
creating an internal control report that assesses "the effectiveness of the internal control
structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting" (United). In addition,
management must perform substantial documentation of the internal control system as
well as perform tests of the internal controls in place in order to make an accurate
assessment. It must make sure that any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses be
portrayed in writing in the internal control report. Also, if the company is using outside
service organizations, such as payroll, management must also consider the outside
company's internal control system before attesting to the soundness of their own.
Additionally, the auditors of the company may help document the company's controls,
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but it is ultimately management's responsibility for that documentation. Management
rnust also be aware that their assessment is not fixed and may be subject to change upon
the future finding of any information that shows weaknesses in the internal control
system previously not seen.
In addressing internal controls, the most significant standard issued since the
establishment of the PCAOB and its regulatory function is Audit Standard 2 [AS 2]. This
standard entitled, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in
Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, has had significant impact on the
corporate environment of public companies as well as their auditors. The requirements of
Audit Standard 2 have considerably increased the extensiveness of the auditor's work in
their audit of a public company. The auditors must express a total of three opinions on the
company when issuing a combined audit report: an opinion on the financial statements,
an opinion on the internal controls of the company, and an opinion on management's
assessment of the company's internal controls. The standard presents auditors with very
detailed instructions on how to properly audit a company's internal controls while also
auditing their client's financial statements. The responsibility of the auditor in their audit
of internal controls is to "obtain a reasonable assurance about whether the company
maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over fmancial reporting"
(AS 2.4). While the auditor of a company's financial statements is not engaged to provide
100 percent assurance that fraud is not present, he/she is to obtain reasonable assurance.
No audit offmancial statements can ever provide 100 percent assurance due to the
limitations inherent in the audit, such as not being able to test all transactions that flow
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through a company. However, the risk of financial statement fraud is reduced by
providing assurance that an effective system of internal controls is in place.
In addition to the increased amount of reporting on a company' s internal controls,
the Sarbanes Oxley Act affects other aspects of financial reporting. Financial statements
issued by a company now must be certified by the CEO and CFO of the company,
attesting that the statements do not contain any misleading information and that they
portray an accurate depiction ofthe company's fmancial condition. This.attestation also
is extended to the status and effectiveness of their company's internal control system. To
help ensure certification, the SEC will not accept a company's financial statements unless
they are certified by management. Without certifying their statements, a public company
faces delisting by the SEC (Golden), while a company that files materially misleading
statements with the SEC faces severe legal penalties.
Another significant effect of Sarbanes Oxley on financial reporting stems from
Section 401 of the act which deals with off-balance sheet transactions, pro forma figures,
and special purpose entities. Companies must "disclose all material off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations), and other
relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a
material current or future effect on financial condition" (United). Also, any pro forma
information disclosed in financial statements must be accurate, not be untrue or fail to
"state a material fact," and not be misleading. Regarding special purpose entities, the
Sarbanes Oxley Act requires companies to disclose "the extent of off-balance sheet
transactions, inCluding assets, liabilities, leases, losses, and the use of special purpose
entities" (United). Through these requirements it is the goal of Congress for investors to
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be able to see more accurate portrayals of the financial statements of public companies
through more accurate reporting of their assets and obligations.
In addition to a more complete disclosure of a company' s financial situation, audit
committees also are required to have much more independence from management. Audit
related tasks that were once assigned to the audit committee by the board of directors are
now permanent responsibilities of the committee mandated by Sarbanes Oxley (Kelson).
Audit committees "shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and
oversight of the work of the company's outside auditors," (United) and outside auditors
are now to report directly to the audit committee. "Every audit committee member must
be an independent member of the board of directors of the issuer, meaning that. .. such a
person may not receive any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the
issuer or otherwise be affiliated with the issuer or any subsidiary of the issuer" (Kelson).
The audit committee must also be able to handle complaints regarding accounting or
auditing by anonymous employees, be "authorized to retain independent counsel," and
provide funding for this counsel and the outside auditors (Kelson). Creating a more
independent and active audit committee will continue to help lessen the opportunity for
employees at all levels of the organization to commit financial statement fraud.
Moreover, Section 407 of Sarbanes Oxley requires the specific disclosure of
whether or not a company has a financial expert on the audit committee and whether
he/she is independent of management. If a company's audit committee does not have a
fmancial expert, adequate explanation is then required. This financial expert, according to
the SEC, is someone who has "an understanding of GAAP and financial statements," has
"experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements," has "an
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understanding of internal controls and financial reporting procedures," as well as "an
understanding of audit committee functions" (Scarpati).
Another issue that Congress wanted to address when creating the Sarbanes Oxley
Act of2002 was excessive executive compensation and benefit plans and the lack of
accountability. Executives are no longer eligible to receive personal loans from their
company which can be a significant source of financial statement fraud. Loans that may
fall under this ruling include "relocation loans, advances for travel expenses, and signing
or retention bonuses which must be repaid if the executive terminates employment under
certain circumstances" (McGuiness). However, small loan amounts and advances for
routine employee expenses fall under less scrutiny than much larger transactions between
an executive and the company largely due to materiality constraints. In addition, Section
304 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act increases accountability by reducing executive
compensation if their company is required to restate financial statements due to
misconduct. Upon restatement, the company's CEO and CFO must pay the company an
amount equal to "any bonus, incentive award, or equity-based compensation received by
the executive during the twelve-month period beginning on the date the statements were
first filed with the SEC, and any profits realized by the executive on the sale of company
stock during this twelve-month period" (McGuiness). This ensures that the extra
compensation from awards and stock trades results from honest business practices and
information, and it places an added incentive for the CEO and CFO to want to be as
certain as possible that the financial statements that they are certifying are free from
material errors and/or fraud and accurately present the state of the company.
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Furthermore, other corporate governance issues include the requiring of insider
stock trades between an executive and his/her company to be reported to the SEC by the
end of the second business day after the transaction, rather than their previously having
up 45 days to report. This reporting requirement also applies to company directors and
anyone with a 10 percent ownership in the company (McGuiness). Sarbanes Oxley also
prohibits "corporate directors and executive officers from trading employer securities
during a plan blackout period with respect to those securities; and requires Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)- covered individual account plans to provide
30 days notice of blackout periods" (McGuiness).
Because of the changes made by Sarbanes Oxley, shareholders are able to see a
clearer picture of the financial standing of their company as well as their internal control
structure. Also, with increased penalties for fraudulent activities, corporate executives are
held more accountable for their actions (United). While some shareholders may complain
about the additional costs of compliance with Sarbanes Oxley, comparing them to an
unwanted tax on shareholders (Solomon), the ultimate effect of this Act is to create a
corporate environment where a company's financial information more accurately
portrays its financial condition, helping shareholders to take conective actions in casting
votes for executives, increasing investments, or even investing elsewhere.

FASB Interpretation No. 46R
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of2002 and its implementation of the PCAOB was a
huge step by Congress to put forth practices that will and have helped prevent massive
fmancial statement frauds from occurring, but it is not, by far, the only measure that has
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been taken. In December of2003 in an effort to help clarify the accounting for special
purpose entities, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued F ASB Interpretation
No. 46R [FIN 46R] Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. This issuance by the
FASB is an interpretation of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 Consolidated
Financial Statements in order to provide more guidance on what exactly constitutes a
controlling financial interest. Prior to this statement, the common practice was to only
consolidate entities for which the primary beneficiary held a controlling interest, defmed
as having a majority of the voting rights of the entity's stock. However, significant
variable interest relationships can be structured in a way in which the primary beneficiary
does not have a majority of the voting rights, but still effectively has a controlling interest
in the entity. In forming this interpretation, the F ASB focused its scope on one class of
special purpose entity: the variable interest entity [VIE].
A variable interest entity is defined as "an entity that is not self supportive in that
it cannot finance its activities without receiving additional subordinated financial support
from another entity or individual" (Lander). According to FIN 46R, a VIE is subject to
consolidation if by design it meets any one of the following:
1. "The equity investment at risk is not sufficient to permit the entity to finance its
activities without additional subordinated financial support provided by any
patties, including the equity holders.
2. The equity investors lack one or more of the following essential characteristics of
a controlling financial interest:
a. The direct or indirect ability to make decisions about the entity' s activities
through voting rights or similar rights
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b. The obligation to absorb the expected losses of the entity
c. The right to receive the expected residual returns of the entity
3. The equity investors have voting rights that are not proportionate to their
economic interests, and the activities of the entity involve or are conducted on
behalf of an investor with a disproportionately small voting interest." (FIN 46R)
The requirements for consolidation have moved away from basing a primary
beneficiary' s controlling financial interest on voting rights, and they now apply a new
"risk and rewards" model to determining whether consolidation is necessary (Reinstein
29). Essentially, consolidation is required if the entity is a variable interest entity, the
entity has a variable interest in the VIE, and it is also the primary beneficiary. If the party
is not the primary beneficiary ofthe VIE, essentially giving the VIE the majority of its
support, then consolidation is not required, but the party should disclose the relationship
if it is significant to the company. However, the majority of voting power still remains
sufficient grounds to require consolidation under current GAAP accounting.
These new consolidation guidelines present a stark contrast between those in
practice before the issuance of FIN 46R. Before the Enron collapse in 2001, a special
purpose entity or variable interest entity was exempt from consolidation as long as it was
able to obtain a three percent equity investment of the fair value of the SPE from outside
parties (Reinstein 29). The threshold for non consolidation has now been changed to a ten
percent equity investment, but the threshold is not as clear-cut as the old one. The
substance of the relationship with the VIE must be assessed using both qualitative and
quantitative factors before determining whether or not to consolidate and whether or not
the VIE can actually finance its own activities without additional subordinated financial
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support. Additionally, when using the new risk and rewards model for assessing the need
to consolidate, if the VIE's risks and rewards are spread among unrelated parties, and no
single patty absorbs a majority [51 %] of the VIE's losses on returns, the VIE is not
required to be consolidated," while a primary beneficiary is presumed to have fmancial
control over the VIE and therefore must consolidate. (Lander).
While the FASB now requires the consolidation of variable interest entities in
many instances, they have identified several exceptions that are not covered in the scope
of FIN 46R. Not-for-profit organizations are not included except in the cases that they are
being used by other businesses in order to avoid complying with FIN 46R. Employee
benefit plans are also not subject to this interpretation if they are already subject to a
previous F ASB Statement. Also, registered investment companies are not required to
consolidate their variable interest entities except if that entity is itself a registered
investment company. Yet another exception to the scope of FIN 46R occurs when a
business has a variable interest in a "qualifying special-purpose entity" covered by the
regulations in FASB Statement 140, unless the business is able to cause that entity to
change enough so it no longer qualifies for the exception in the FASB Statement. This
requires that the special purpose entity "maintains its qualifying status under previous
accounting standards, does not issue new beneficial interests after the effective date, and
does not receive assets it was not committed to receive before the effective date" (F ASB
SFAS 140). Separate accounts oflife insurance agencies are also not included in the
scope of the interpretation. Furthermore, a variable interest entity is not required to be
consolidated if it was formed before December 31, 2003 and the enterprise is unable to
acquire the information to determine if it is a variable interest entity, if it is the primary
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beneficiary ofthe entity, or if it is unable to account for the variable interest entity
consolidation it is the primary beneficiary for. One of the last exceptions to the scope of
this ruling is that "an enterprise is not required to consolidate a governmental
organization or a fmancing entity established by a governmental organization.
Despite not covering all special purpose entities and there still being numerous
exceptions to the practices set forth, FIN 46R will result in the consolidation of a
significant amount of assets and liabilities to the balance sheets of companies. This
consolidation will result in, as Reinstein, Lander, and Danese suggest in their article, for
some entities, the violation of debt covenants upon consolidation (30). Creditors and
investors will now be able to see a more accurate picture of the fmancial state of their
debtor or investment. By placing these amounts back on the balance sheet and into the
sight of investors and creditors, it is making it harder for companies to hide as much debt
as that which lead to the fraud and sudden downfall of companies like Enron
Corporation.

Statement of Auditing Standard 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit
Beyond the new requirements and procedures that have been put in place to
prevent management from committing financial statement fraud, there has also been an
added emphasis on auditors in detecting such fraud through new regulations. The
Statement of Auditing Standard 99 [SAS 99]: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit is the most recent and comprehensive in outlining an auditor's
responsibility for detecting fraud when performing the audit of their client's financial
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statements. While SAS 99 was being drafted prior to the accounting frauds at Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, it was finally adopted in November 2002, making its
implementation even more important in the efforts to prevent future financial statement
fraud.
Ultimately, the responsibility to prevent fraud in an organization rests with
management and not the company' s auditors. The auditor's responsibility is to "plan and
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements
are free of material misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud," with the ·purpose of
SAS 99 being to "establish standards and provide guidance to auditors in fulfilling their
responsibility as it relates to fraud in an audit of financial statements conducted in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards" (AU 316.01 ). SAS 99 also
stresses the fact that the most likely candidates in an organization to commit financial
statement fraud are the company's management because they have the most opportunity
in the company to carry out such frauds due to their access to key financial reporting
elements. Despite auditors' responsibility to provide reasonable assurance that fraud is
not present in their client's fmancial statements, they can never give absolute assurance
that fraud does not exist in the statements. This stems from inherent limitations in the
audit, especially regarding management's participation in the fraud. Collusion among
management and with third parties, resulting in false, withheld, or misrepresented
documentation, along with management override of controls can circumvent an auditor's
best efforts and procedures (Bukics).
Because of an auditor's responsibility, and management's likelihood to commit
fraud, SAS 99 now requires that auditors maintain constant professional skepticism while
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performing their audit. The statement defines professional skepticism as "an attitude that
includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence" (AU 316.13).
When performing the audit, the auditor should not take into consideration their
relationship with the client's management and their opinion on the past honesty of
management when assessing the audit evidence gathered. The auditor should not accept
any evidence that is less than persuasive based on these criteria. Also, while performing
tlle audit of their client's statements, the members of the audit team should have a
brainstorming session to think up various and creative ways that their client could
perpetrate fraud and where weaknesses may be present (AU 316.14).
SAS 99 also places emphasis on the auditor obtaining knowledge of his/her
client's business environment. This will help auditors to better determine the likelihood
of fraud occurring in their client's organization, by comparing them with their peers.
Furthermore, as a part of this knowledge acquisition process, the auditor should inquire
of management and others within the organization as to their perceived fraud risks and
how they are being remedied. These inquiries can include whether management has any
specific knowledge of fraud occurring within the company or even inquiring as to how
management communicates its views on business practices and ethical behavior to its
employees (AU 316.20). Communications should also be made with the audit committee
to ascertain·whether they suspect or are aware of any fraudulent activity. Also, the auditor
is to consider any unusual or unexpected relationships that may be evident after
performing analytical procedures in the planning stages of the audit. By examining these
unusual relationships, fraudulent activity can often be discovered due to the perpetrator's
inability to adjust all accounts that relate to the fraudulent misstatement. Furthermore, the
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auditor should consider whether one or more fraud risk factors are present in the
company as well as any other factor that may be of significance to the audit (AU 316.19).
SAS 99 also places a heavy emphasis on the auditor's professional judgment
when analyzing situations for fraud. There are several instances when an auditor' s
judgment plays an important role in implementing SAS 99 and examining fraud.
Determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures to better insure against
fraudulent fmancial reporting, as well as determining the right people to direct inquiries
regarding potential fraud heavily relies on the auditor's judgment. Judgment is also a key
factor when considering which fraud risk factors are of most concern and are most
applicable to the current situation, as well as determining which trends and relationships
determined in the analytical procedures during the planning phase of the audit are
indicative of a potential fraud risk (Bukics).
When faced with an elevated amount of assessed fraud risk, there are certain tests
and procedures that are recommended in SAS 99. Making surprise or unannounced visits
to the client and conducting audit procedures at that time are suggested to provide
management very little time to cover. up any fraudulent activity prior to the auditor's
arrival. Also, inventory counts may be conducted closer to year-end rather than at an
interim date to obtain a more accurate representation of year-end amounts. In addition,
the auditor may send out written confirmations and inquire of major customers as to their
perspective on the potential for fraud occurring at the company. This practice allows
auditors to assess possible areas for fraud to occur from another point of view. Moreover,
interviewing individuals who work outside of the accounting department and top
management may provide the auditor with an additional perspective on the internal
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controls of the organization as well as the likelihood of management override (Bukics).
SAS 99 also singles out revenue recognition to be a presumed fraud risk when conducting
their audit. The auditor should perform audit procedures that will be able to test the
existence, completeness, and valuation of the tepmted revenue amounts due to the ease
with which fraud can occur in this area.

Current/Upcoming Changes in Accounting Practice
The standards setting bodies of the accounting profession are continually working
to update and modemize accounting practices and methods as the need arises in an effort
to clarify, fix, and improve current standards. By closing loopholes in accounting
standards and structuring them in a way that there is less room for aggressive and creative
accounting and varying interpretations, these agencies are helping to reduce the
opportunity for companies to commit financial statement fraud. As long as there is
improvement to be made in the quality of financial reporting and in auditing practices 7
the accounting profession will continue to change. Currently, for example, the FASB is
working on updating its guidance on revenue recognition, pensions, and leases.

•

Revenue Recognition Update
Since the failures at Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia, practices regarding

revenue recognition have largely remained the same. It is still the most common way for
management to misstate their company's financial statements, largely due to the
confusion and significant degree of latitude that management has in applying revenue
recognition standards. With currently over 200 pronouncements by various standard
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setting bodies (Project), it is clear as to why the F ASB wants to develop a single,
comprehensive revenue recognition standard. Currently, the F ASB has created a project
task force to work on updating its guidance on revenue recognition and to provide a
comprehensive standard for its application.
The current goals ofthe new revenue recognition project are to improve financial
reporting by:

1. "Converging U.S. and international standards on revenue recognition
2. Eliminating inconsistencies in the existing conceptual guidance on revenues
3. Providing conceptual guidance that would be useful in addressing revenue
recognition issues that may arise in the future
4. Eliminating inconsistencies in existing standards-level authoritative literature and
accepted practices
5. Filling voids in revenue recognition guidance that have developed over time
6. Establishing a single, comprehensive standard on revenue recognition." (Project).

This new statement on revenue recognition is expected to be released by the end
of 2007. Of interesting note and importance is the fact that the FASB is working closely
with the International Accounting Standards Board [IASB] in order to develop a standard
and related guidance that will be applicable internationally rather than just in the United
States. In forming its standard, the FASB is currently leaning towards using the approach
of measuring revenues based on the changes of assets and liabilities of a company, as
stated in FASB Concepts Statement 6, rather than using the earned and realized or
realizable method (Project). This should eliminate much of the leeway in the recognition
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of revenues based on different interpretations of the words "earned" and "realized or
realizable." By filling in the voids in revenue recognition guidance and establishing a
single and more comprehensive standard, the opportunity to misstate revenue in the
fmancial statements will be significantly decreased.

•

Pension Accounting Update
The FASB has just released a new standard in September 2006, SF AS No. 158

Employers' Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Post Retirement Plans, as
the fust part of its comprehensive plan to improve accounting for pensions. One of the
most significant steps that this standard takes is to require that companies must recognize
the overfunded or underfunded status of their postretirement benefit plans on the face of
the balance sheet rather than it being buried in the notes (SFAS No. 158). This
recognition must be made for public companies with balance sheet dates of December

31st 2006 or later. Such a disclosure will make it much easier for financial statement users
to assess the overall financial state of the company. On the other hand, the fact that the
funded status is still netted with the obligations still hides the true nature and size of the
pension obligation, especially since the assets funding the plan as of the balance sheet
date may be withdrawn after that time. Furthe1more, the plan assets and obligations are
now required to be measured as of the financial statement date rather than up to three
months before (Apostolou 1). The new standard also makes changes in the recognition of
prior service cost and net gains and losses on the pension plan in an attempt to provide
improve the accounting for these aspects of pensions. While these amounts were
originally allowed to be amortized over some period of time, the F ASB now requires that

Christian 54
the costs be recognized as a part of other comprehensive income. Also, any delayed
recognition of such gains and losses must now be disclosed in the notes of the financial
statements (SFAS 158) rather than the past practice of no recognition at all. This
disclosure, while not necessarily as accurate as disclosing the losses and prior service
costs in the financial statements at least brings these once hidden amounts to the attention
of investors and creditors.

•

Lease Accounting Update
In another effort to further improve financial reporting, lease accounting is in the

very early stages of being updated to remedy its complexities and to be able to close
some of the loopholes in hiding debt and assets from companies' balance sheets. The
FASB is again working with the IASB to form an international "working group" to
provide input on this topic (Intermediate 6). It is expected that the group will release a
discussion paper on the topic sometime in 2008. Increased capitalization of leases is a
must to more accurately depict a company' s financial position in its statements. The
substance, whether the company is essentially purchasing the item or renting it, should be
emphasized over the form of the transaction. The ability to avoid capitalization of a lease
using contractual terms rather than changing the economic substance of the transaction
should be eliminated.
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Chapter 4 - The Effectiveness of the Changes & the Effect on Corporate Social
Responsibility.

Since the seemingly endless string of financial statement and corporate frauds that
made up the first half of this decade, much has been done in an attempt to insure that
nothing of the sort will happen again. With so many new standards passed in such a short
amount oftime, the full ramifications of these standards are still being determined. Some
of the standards are costing companies much more in the way of audit fees to implement
than was expected. Others, while sounding good on paper, fall short of their goals.
However, despite the expense and continuing need for improvement and implementation,
one change that has most definitely occurred due to the recent frauds is the added focus
on corporate social responsibility and the ethical workplace.

I
I

Added Cost: Is it Worth it?
When the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was passed, issuing its sweeping reforms
of accounting practices for public companies, many knew that significant costs would be
incurred in complying with the regulations. The question on many executives' minds was
"How much will it cost to implement, and will it be worth it?" An article in Global

Finance states that the costs of compliance are estimated at $4.36 million for each of the
largest U.S. companies (Hawser 48). Costs of compliance for smaller firms are estimated
to exceed 2.5 percent of their total revenues (Harrington). These high costs of complying
with this Act are causing some American companies to consider going private and
causing some foreign companies to not list in American stock exchanges (The
Economist). While the direct costs of complying with Sarbanes Oxley are higher than
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initially expected, a cost-benefit analysis is hard to perform because the perceived
benefits are hard to quantify. It may be easy to put a dollar figure on audit services
received or employee salaries required to comply with the Act, but it is hard to place a
value on increased investor confidence, sounder financial statements, better internal
controls, and a greater sense of corporate ethics.
Only time will tell ifthe reforms ofSarbanes Oxley really achieve the goals of
improving investor confidence and reducing and eliminating corporate fraud. If these
goals are ultimately achieved, the costs will be most definitely worth it, but it seems
hardly likely that corporate scandals will cease. As an article in The Economist says,
"The first great post-SOX corporate scandal-you can bet there will be one-should be very
revealing" (The Economist). Only then will we know if these costs are worth the results
obtained. One thing that is certain is that it is unfortunate that corporate America needs
such sweeping legislation imposing significant costs to ensure that companies honestly
and ethically report information and follow business practices.
Currently, many individuals and businesses are calling for changes to this
legislation and the regulations that followed from it. With the corporate scandals "nearly
five years ago fading from memory, an array of companies and business leaders have
been making the case that the laws and rules enacted amid the crisis are overly onerous
and costly" (Business). The newly formed Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
states that many of the regulations imposed by Sarbanes Oxley are inhibiting the growth
of U.S. capital markets, citing that only one of the last twenty five largest IPOs in the

I

world was listed in U.S. markets. Most of these firms, however, were from overseas, and
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sewer appropriately argues that "if foreign firms fmd our desire [U.S.] for transparency
so distasteful, do we really want them here anyway?" (Sewer 39).
These complaints have not fallen on deaf ears. Both the PCAOB and the SEC are
currently working on taking action to provide better guidance on how to implement some
ofthese regulations and changing others to be more cost effective and less time
consuming. The SEC's proposed guidance on internal control over financial reporting
recommends a "top-down risk based approach" (Deloitte). This newly defined approach
places more judgment into the hands of the auditors when conducting the audit of a
company's internal controls in conjunction with the audit of their financial statements.
The focus on the audit should be placed on those areas that could contribute to a material
misstatement rather than evaluating and testing practically every control in the company.
Also, the new guidance proposes that the audit be "scalable and flexible" to match the
needs and the level of risk present at each client, rather than a "one-size fits all" audit
approach (Deloitte). Furthermore, the extensive documentation that is required to be
performed under the current Audit Standard 2 should be reduced to correspond to the
level of risk of misstatement.
These changes defmitely address some of the concerns as to the length and cost of
audits. However, by taking more of a risk based approach, the auditor must avoid
becoming complacent in testing the typical accounts that are traditionally high risk. If the
management of a company is able to predict the patterns of their auditor by knowing
which accounts or assertions are to be scrutinized more heavily, they can commit fraud in
other areas of their statements (Basilo 8).
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When implementing these changes, it is important that businesses and their
auditors do not sacrifice the quality of their audits simply in the hope of lowering costs.
In an article by Bierstaker, Brody, and Pacini, the authors found that in a sampling of
fraud prevention and detection techniques, the smaller the firm, the more reluctant it was
to invest in various methods to prevent fraud. Furthermore, concerning all of the
companies studied, they concluded that the one of the most expensive prevention
techniques, the use of forensic accountants was the least used method to detect and
prevent fraud, despite being rated the most effective by accountants, internal auditors,
and CFEs at fraud prevention (Bierstaker 530). The cost-benefit analysis still remains a
significant factor for both small as well as large businesses and accounting firms in the
prevention of fraud. With every new statement passed, accountants must be trained and
businesses must pay for additional procedures.
The added costs of these additional procedures and implementing new accounting
regulations and standards have significantly increased the transparency of financial
reporting. Over the past five years since the passage of new accounting measures and
reporting requirements, the number of financial statement restatements has significantly
increased. The graph below shows that not only have the number of restatements
continually increased since 1997, but the slope of the graph has continued to increase,
especially after 2002. For 2004, the number of companies restating their financials was
approximately one out of every twenty three public companies. The trend continues to
increase with restatements in 2005 equating to one out of every twelve companies
(Turner). The increasing number of restatements showcases the need for further
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improvement in fmancial reporting to provide the most accurate financial information to

the public.
Graph 4: Cumulative Annual Restatements by U.S. Domiciled Publicly Traded Companies by Yea1·
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Furthetmore, many of the restatements are not even from complex accounting
issues. According to Turner and Weirich, hundreds of restatements are from the
misapplication of simple accounting rules or breakdowns in corporate controls. With
continued tightening of audit practices with an increased focus on company internal
controls, restatements will only continue to increase. With these restatements, however,
comes higher quality financial information. As companies learn how to better apply
accounting standards and establish more effective internal controls, the number of these
restatements should begin to level off and eventually decrease. However, since the
accounting profession is going through this significant period of change, restatements
will continue to occur in large numbers. These restatements showcase that the accounting
practices were in dire need of restructuring and the new changes are requiring companies
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to take a closer, more thorough look at their accounting processes and the information
that they produce to ensure that it fairly represents the financial state of the company.

The Effect on Corporate Social Responsibility
While the Sarbanes Oxley Act has resulted in the implementation of a significant
amount of change and improved financial reporting, there is no doubt that it and the other
changes to fmancial reporting will provide better quality financial information. However,
there will always be those that try to skirt the rules and continue to contribute to fmancial
statement fraud. By making CEOs, CFOs, and other executives more accountable for
their actions and placing more of the responsibility and liability for fraudulent statements
on their shoulders, Sarbanes Oxley uses the fear of increased punishment as a deterrent
for committing financial statement fraud. However, while this may work for some
executives, there will continue to be those that do not fear this increase because they do
not believe that they will be caught in the first place, or they believe that the added risk of
committing fraud is worth it to both the company and themselves.
When executives believe that committing fraud is a necessary risk, it showcases
the need for increased ethical leadership in companies. Ethical leadership has always
been a necessity for corporations to avoid fraud, and, since the recent lapses in ethics at
Enron and World Com, a priority for companies has been bringing added focus to ethical
and socially responsible corporate governance. A new wave of corporate social
responsibility is sweeping corporate America. This ideology, while not a new idea by any
means, now has front burner attention from investors and the public in general. As
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Jennings states in her article, "Companies collapse ethically long before suffering
financial demise."
One of the most common methods companies are using to implement corporate
'al
nsibility into the work environment in an effort to prevent fraud is the
soc1 respo

ideology of "the stakeholder approach." Using this approach, the firm acts in the best
.
t fall parties that may be involved with their business not simply the
mteres so
'
shareholders (Coelho 15). In addition to shareholders, the stakeholders in a business
include the environment, the surrounding community, employees, and anyone else that
roayhave an interest in the company's actions. Companies now proudly display
statements regarding their organization's ethical culture and commitment to benefit
society. However, ·these intentions are all well and good, but it is the company's actions
that speak louder than words when it comes to corporate ethics. Enron, as a matter of
fact, had a comprehensive policy of corporate ethics, but as one can easily see, that policy
had no real value. Once the tone at the top of the company was compromised, the trickle
down effect took hold, with everyone in the company looking for the quickest way to
make a significant profit, regardless of the method. It was an "end justifies the means"
kind of mentality.
Companies with these new ethical standards must make sure that they are much
more than just words on a sheet of paper. They must tmly reflect the values of top
and become ingrained in the corporate culture of the organization A zero
management
·
tolerance policy should be implemented for ethical lapses within the company, setting an
example for employees to see that a disregard for ethical principles will result in their
dismissal. However, a culture of fear in regards to following the ethical guidelines
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proposed by the company will not be effective either, and may actually hurt employee
morale. Employees and management should ultimately want to follow ethical practices
and procedures rather than have them forced upon them.
In addition to helping to prevent fraud in the organization, corporate social

responsibility has taken a hold in investment portfolios in the form of socially responsible
investing. While this type of investing, like the stakeholder theory of corporate social
responsibility is not a new one, the recent scandals have placed a new emphasis on the
practice and investors seem to be on board. This type of investing is a great channel for
investors to place their dollars behind causes in which they believe and a way of
punishing companies that may have problems with corporate governance which can
directly lead to fraud. An article in Funds International states that "the fallout from
financial scandals is causing investors to vote with their feet, moving into funds that
really pay attention - and not just lip seJ;Vice - to ethics and the environment when it
comes to selecting their investment vehicles." Over two trillion dollars are estimated to
be invested in the United States as of2005 the primary criteria for investment dependent
on ethics and corporate social responsibility (Socially 10). While the information
regarding the degree of returns varies from no increased return to a higher return when
compared to non-socially responsible investing, the overarching consensus is that
investors do not have lower returns. However, as was the case with Enron, these
companies may seem to have ethical principles written in their company policies, they
may invest in good causes around the world, but if the management of the company
cannot control or implement these ethical standards, this investing may not be very
effective in preventing future frauds.
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Reform the Market?
Despite socially responsible investing, the financial markets can be ruthless to
companies, providing management with one of the most significant pressures on them to
commit fraud. The trend toward socially responsible investing may help support
companies that are involved with socially responsible causes, but the majority of
investors simply want to earn the highest return possible on their investment. These
investors, as mentioned earlier, severely punish companies when they do not meet their
earnings targets, resulting in a significant drop in a company's stock price, and often
times, executive compensation which can be closely tied to the stock price by way of
stock options. The financial markets are also built around the idea of continuous growth.
After a particularly outstanding year of growth, investors want to see the same, if not
better numbers for growth the following year. A company can still have a year of high
financial growth, but if it is not as high as the financial analysts expected, then it is not
good enough. Is it possible that investors, like management, can be too demanding,
wanting only the highest returns for themselves? Investors concerned more with shortterm profits and instant riches dump stocks at the slightest sight of weakness in a
company, without looking into the company's long-term prospects. While socially
responsible investing is a great start to reforming the market to reward companies based
on factors other than operating income, stock price and P/E ratios, it will be nearly
impossible to reform the markets to accept anything less than the best from a company.
Since the pressure of the market to meet and exceed earnings estimates will always be
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placed on companies, the standards setting bodies are acting to further reduce the
opportunity for financial statement fraud.

Looking Ahead: Uncertainty Abounds
With all the recent changes in the accounting industry to increase transparent
financial reporting and focus on corporate ethics, one significant question remains: Are
all of these changes effective, and where is the accounting profession heading? One thing
is for sure, there have been no major accounting scandals since the implementation of
many of these new regulations. Since the passage of such acts and standards, such as the
Sarbanes Oxley Act, the reporting of public companies is becoming much more
transparent through additional disclosures and accountability and continues to do so with
each passing standard or interpretation. The environment is right for the passage of many
of these new standards that companies at one time would have fought to stop. With the
new emphasis on corporate social responsibility, any company lobbying to oppose a new
accounting standard that is meant to increase transparency of company information in the
fight against corporate fraud would effectively tarnish their reputation and potentially
lose investors. One of the biggest uncertainties in the efforts to improve fmancial
accounting is the significant discussion regarding a shift towards principles-based
accounting from the current rules-based methods as well as reducing the complexity of
financial reporting.
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Principles or Rules Based?
With all of the new standards being issued to improve financial reporting and
reduce the potential for companies to commit financial statement fraud, it is becoming
more and more difficult for accountants to keep up with new rules and standards. Under
the current rules-based accounting system, proper accounting methods that are not
specifically covered by the standards are open for aggressive interpretation by company
management, leading to misstatements such as those seen at Enron, Tyco, and Adelphia.
Company management has more of an incentive to fmd ways around the rules to better
present the company's financial statements, highlighting the need for strong corporate
ethics. As a business professor states in an article by Jennings, "It takes the Financial
Accounting Standards Board two years to issue a ruling and the investment bankers [or
corporate managers] two weeks to figure a way around it" (Jennings 48). It is nearly
impossible to predict all of the potential permutations of a transaction and the different
ways of accounting for them. Under the current rules-based system, whatever is not
specifically laid out in the rules, can be interpreted by management and their accountants
to make the company's statements look better, largely stressing the form of the
transaction over the substance of it.
By establishing a predominantly principles-based accounting system the
underlying substance in accounting for transactions will be emphasized rather than its
strict form. For example, in accounting for leases, if a third party looking at a lease
agreement would upon first glance see that the lease is essentially a purchase of an asset,
the lease should be accounted for as a capital lease rather than "playing games" with the
numbers to prevent capitalization on the books. Lease accounting has become overly
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concerned about the form of the transactions to the point that in some cases, both the
lessee and the lessor are recording the same piece of property in a way that the leased
asset is not present on either party' s books. By forcing management to account for the
principle of the transaction rather than how it is physically constructed, principles-based
accounting will help to eliminate much of the push towards finding loopholes in the rules
to manipulate the company's financials.
However, the very nature of principles-based accounting will create accounting
concepts that will be broader based and loosely defined, leaving gaps in how to properly
account for specific transactions and events. Without specific rules-based accounting,
many of the proper methods for accounting for transactions may be lost. A hybrid
principles-rules based accounting system may be the best answer to address some of
these issues. The principles would provide an overarching framework for accounting,
while the specific rules could be used for implementation guidance. Unfortunately, the
business world consists of very complex transactions that do not fit nicely into any one
category and guidance standard. By having principles based accounting, the general
guidance provided by the applicable principle can be used until a specific accounting
treatment is specified by the FASB to take into consideration some of the smaller nuances
of the transaction. Ultimately, by transitioning away from rules-based accounting and
towards a system based more on principles of accounting, there will be less roo_m for
management to use the excuse, "Well the rules did not say I could not account for it this
way," as a defense when manipulating their books.

Christian 67
N_ew Regulations Still Need Improvement
As the F ASB is looking towards shifting accounting principles to the forefront of
authoritative guidance, a reduction of complexity in the standards is also in order. As of
February 27, 2007, Congress unanimously passed an act called the Promoting
Transparency in Financial Reporting Act of 2007 to call together the financial and
accounting governing bodies such as the FASB, SEC, and PCAOB to reduce complexity
in financial reporting. (KPMG 1). By reducing the complexity of financial repmiing not
only will it be easier to account for and generate financial statements, but it will be easier
for investors to read and understand the information that is presented. However, as
previously discussed, many business transactions are inherently complex and could call
for varying methods to account for them properly. As KPMG mentions in its article,
some of this "complexity" may be viewed by some as a necessary clarification of a
transaction's accounting.
It is necessary for the FASB and other standards setting bodies to weigh the
benefits of streamlining accounting practices while still providing enough guidance that
the conceptual standards are not too simplistic or vague, leaving substantial areas for
interpretation that aggressive management will use to their advantage in misleading
investors. One recent suggestion by several in the accounting profession has been for the
profession to shift more towards a fair value basis for accounting rather than the
traditional cost basis. The FASB has recently issued two standards, SFAS 157 and SFAS
159, that aim to increase the use of fair value accounting. Statement 159 specifically
gives companies more choice in whether they may account for financial instruments at
fair value. A shift of this type would have huge implications on the accounting
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profession. It has long been argued that accounting at historical costs traditionally
undervalues corporate assets, and does not portray an accurate depiction of the state of a
corporation. Also, when looking at a company's financial statements, investors frequently
make adjustments on their own, converting historical costs into current fair values in
analyzing the company. These adjustments help provide the investors with the most
current financial state of the company rather than using information past on past values.
With accountants using fair value accounting as the base for determining financial
statement amounts, financial information would be presented in a format that more
accurately assesses the situation of the company, and is easier for investors to use.
However, while fair value accounting may decrease complexity in financial
reporting in some respects, it may also increase the complexity and bring into question
the quality of reported information (KPMG 4, Haldeman). The inherent problem that
exists with fair value accounting is how to go about accurately measuring the value of the
asset or liability. While the FASB identifies various methods to reflect an item' s value,
such as using the market values, the present value of future receipts, or the replacement
cost (Haldeman), a significant amount of judgment in valuation on the part of
management and auditors is required, especially when there is no easily determinable
market value for the asset, such as the gas contracts involved with Enron. Using valuation
of this type can easily lead to overstatement of a company's assets, violating the
accounting profession's long held principle of conservatism, and opening the door to
increased fraud. While clarifying fmancial reporting processes and reporting are a goal of
standards setting bodies, Haldeman sums up fair value accounting well in that the "use of
fair valuation has the potential for spectacularly misleading results."
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As mentioned previously with the new guidance on revenue recognition and
accounting for leases, the FASB is currently working with the International Accounting
Standards Board [IASB] to develop standards that will ideally be used around the world
rather than only in the United States, further reducing the complexity of financial
reporting and leveling the playing field with international companies in regards to
accounting practices. This project of "convergence" between international and domestic
accounting standards is a serious undertaking (KPMG 4) that will take decades to fully
implement. By creating one international standard, it will reduce the need for companies
to have to learn specific accounting rules for every country they do business, thus
reducing the complexity of following different rules in different countries. This would
allow companies to report in virtually any ma~ket in the world without having to change
its reporting methods.
More specifically, the new guidance being issued on accounting for pensions,
lease accounting, revenue recognition, and special purpose entities, as well as the
significant changes from Sarbanes Oxley have definitely made progress toward
eliminating the opportunity for management to commit financial statement fraud .
However, as long as there is room for interpretation in these areas, and others financial
reporting will never be completely fraud proof. While the ideas behind the reform of
Sarbanes Oxley and guidance on complex transactions are good ones, ultimately the
ethical values of corporate executives and those surrounding them will determine whether
financial reporting really does improve.
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Conclusions - Ethics are Critical

The string of frauds in 2001 and 2002 shook investor confidence in the U.S.
economy and corporate America, resulting in billions of dollars in losses. While fraud
can occur in many areas of a business, it is financial statement fraud that is the most
devastating to the market. Everyday, investors rely on the quality of a company' s
fmancial statements to make educated investment decisions. When this information is
falsified, the efficiency of the market is lost and consumer resources are misallocated to
organizations that are not performing as well as their financials portray.
Even with the best system of financial reporting, the pressure of financial markets
will have executives thinking of every possible way to meet earnings projections and
have stellar looking financial statements. This pressure, while it can be a constructive
force, leading management to think of new and creative business prospects that may yield
high returns for both investors and owners, it can also be a destructive pressure, leading
management to think of fraudulent accounting methods to hide the true nature of the
company's financial status. As the frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia have
shown, a breakdown in ethics in corporate governance along with accounting
complexities can lead to substantial frauds. Despite thorough financial accounting
practices and standards, management, especially a colluding team of executives and
employees, can still commit financial statement fraud if they are determined to do so.
Because of this, ethics are critical in top management and throughout the organization.
Without corporate ethics the costs already associated with recently passed
legislation would be even higher, since the only way to increase assurance that no future
frauds might occur would be to add additional accounting and auditing procedures.
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While new standards are being issued regarding complex topics such as leases and
special purpose entities, no standard is comprehensive enough to ensure total compliance
with the proper methods of accounting. More experienced and better trained accountants,
as well as less complex standards, will help to reduce the number of financial
misstatements due to errors and unintentional misapplication of accounting concepts.
Standards that are clearer and more straightforward will make it easier for fraudulent
activities to be detected. However, the individual who is determined to commit fraud will
not be stopped by easier to understand accounting. Auditors remain an integral part of
the financial reporting process and an integral aspect in the discovery of fraud. Because
of the significant amount of judgment involved in performing an audit, considering fraud
requires that the audit team have highly trained and experienced auditors on board in
order to better assess situations in which they may have prior experience.
While more thorough accounting standards and auditing practices will help in the
detection of fraud, the ethical principles of management and the environment that they
create in their organization is the most effective way to prevent future frauds. When the
pressures and opportunity to commit fraud present themselves, an executive with high
moral and ethical standards will be less likely to succumb to these pressures. The external
pressures of market forces will always be with executives to push their company to
continually grow and create returns. It has become the mission of the F ASB, SEC, and
PCAOB to create new standards and guidance to reduce the complexity of financial
reporting and reduce the opportunity for executives who cannot withstand the pressures
to commit fraud.

Christian 72
As the accounting profession continues to move forward in its fight against
financial statement fraud, it will continue to undergo significant change and restructuring.
None of the solutions to prevent financial statement fraud are simple, but it is the hope of
many that the standard setting bodies will be able to strike a balance between the costs of
new regulations and their benefits. Improving financial integrity of the financial
reporting and business valuation processes is critical to prevent future frauds. Together,
corporate America and the accounting profession must establish and maintain a lasting
commitment to ethical practices while continuing to strengthen accounting principles and
guidelines.

Christian 73
Works Cited
"A Star is Born, Then Bums Out." BusinessWeek. 17 December 2001. 26 March 2007.
<http:/lwww.businessweek.com/magazine/content/0 1_ 51 /b3 762006.htm> .
AU Section 316. "Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit" AICPA
Professional Standards. Vol. 1. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Inc: New York, New York: June 1, 2006.
AICPA. "Summary ofSarbanes-Oxley Act of2002." 18 March 2006
<http://thecaq .aicpa.org/Resources/Sarbanes+Oxley/Summary+of+the+Provisions
+of+the+Sarbanes-Oxley+Act+of+2002.htm>.
Apostolou, Nicholas and D. Larry Crumbley. "New Pension Accounting Rules: Defusing
the Retirement Time Bomb." The CPA Journal. (November 2006).
Audit Standard 2. "An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in
Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements," PCAOB. March 24, 2004.
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners [ACFE]. 2006 ACFE Report to the Nation on
Occupational Fraud and Abuse. 2006.
Baldwin, Terry and Daniel Yoo. "Restatements- Traversing Shaky Ground." Trend
Alert. Glass Lewis and Co. (5 June 2005). <http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/26523/leturner091405.pdf.>.
Basile, Thomas. "Reducing Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs." The CPA Journal. 77.1
(January 2007): 6-9.
Biegelmen, Martin T . and Joel T. Bartow. " Fraud's Feeding Frenzy." Executive
Roadmap to Fraud Prevention and Internal Control: Creating a Culture of
Compliance. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2006. 1-24.

Christian 74
Bierstaker, James L., Richard G. Brody, and Carl Pacini. "Accountants' Perceptions
Regarding Fraud Detection and Prevention Methods." Managerial Auditing
Journal. 21.5 (2006): 520-535.
Bukics, Rose Marie L. and John M. Flemming. "Fraud Detection: SAS 99 Increases
Auditors' Responsibilities. Pennsylvania CPA Journal. (Winter 2003) 21 March
2007. <http://www.picpa.org/asp/JournaVjournal_article_details.asp?action=
Normal&ID= 1027>.
"Business Push to Ease 'Enron' Laws." The Associated Press. 2 December 2006.
<http :I lwww.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 159 56482/print/ 1I displaymode/ 1098/>.
Cheney, Glenn. "Revenue Recognition remains accounting's 800-lb Gorilla." Accounting
Today. 20.11 (2006): 16.
Coelho, Philip R. P., James E. McClure, and John A. Spry. "The Social Responsibility of
Corporate Management: A Classical Critique." Mid-American Journal of
Business. 18.1 (Spring 2003): 15-24.
Darazsdi, James J. "Financial Reporting: the abuse-prone areas: a refresher on those
elements of financial reports that are the most vulnerable to impropriety, along
with suggestions for avoiding deception." Directors & Boards. 24.4 (Summer
2003): 54-55.
Deloitte and Touche, LLP. "SEC and PCAOB Update." Heads Up. 14.1 (8 January
2007).
"Drawing Lessons from WorldCom." CNET. 14 July 2002. 11 November 2006.
<http://news.com.com/Drawing+lessons+from+WorldCom/2009-1 022_ 3943517 .html>.

Christian 75
The Economist. "A price worth paying?" 19 May 2005. 13 February 2006.
<http://www .economist.com/business/PrinterFriendly .cfm?story_id=3 9840 19>.
Emshwiller, John R. "Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison; Enron Ex-CEO Faced Longer
Term for Fraud, Conspiracy Conviction; Victims Fund to Get $45 Million." The
Wall Street Journal. 24 Oct. 2006: C.1.
Enron Corporation. "Form 10-Q" Filed August 14, 2001 for the Period Ending June 30,
2001." <http://www.usdoj.gov/enron/exhibit/03-28-p1 /BBC-0001 /Images/
4638.00l.PDF>.
"ERISA Act." Oshman & Mirisola, LLP. 15 April2007. <http://www.oshmanlaw.com/
employment_litigation/erisa_act.html>.
"Ex-WorldCom Accountant Was 'Shocked' at False Entries." The New York Times. 4
February 2005: C6.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB). "FASB Interpretation (FIN) No. 46R
Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities: an interpretation of ARB no . 51."
Norwalk Conn.: FASB. 2003.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB). "Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing ofFinancial
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities." Norwalk Conn.: FASB. 2000.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). "Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) No. 158: Employers' Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension
and Other Postretirement Plans." Norwalk Conn.: FASB. September 2006.
Fornaro, James M. and Rita J. Buttermilch. "Increased Clarity in Accounting for
Operating Leases: Industry Practices Meet GAAP." The CPA Journal. (December

Christian 76
2006). 13 April2007. <http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2006/1206/
essentials/p24 .htm>.
Fox, Loren. Enron: The Rise and Fall. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2003.
Fusaro, Peter C. and Ross M. Miller. What Went Wrong at Enron. New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002.
Golden, Robert. "Financial Statement Fraud and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of2002." Good,
Swartz, Brown, and Berns LLP. 2003.
Haldeman, Jr., Robert G. "Fact, Fiction, and Fair value Accounting at Enron." The CPA
Journal. 76.11 (November 2006). 28 March 2007. <http://www.nysscpa.org/
printversions/cpaj/2006/11 06/p 14.htm>.
Harfenist, Jeffrey T. " Understanding Financial Statement Fraud." UHY Advisors, Inc.
2005. <http://www.theiia.org/chapters/pubdocs/112/Financial_ Statement_Fraud_
2005_Print_ Version. pdf>.
Harrington, Cynthia. "The Value Proposition." Journal of Accountancy. September 2005.
Hawser, Anita. "The Cost of Compliance." Global Finance. 21.1 (January 2007): 47-49.
"Intermediate Accounting Newsletter." Iss. 7. September 2006.
Jennings, Marianne M. "The Critical Role of Ethics." The Internal Auditor 60.6
(December 2003): 46-51.
Jickling, Mark. "The Enron Collapse: An Overview of Financial Issues." The Enron
Scandal. Ed. Theodore F. Sterling. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,
2002.

Christian 77
---. "Enron Bankruptcy: Issues for Financial Oversight." The Enron Scandal. Ed.
Theodore F. Sterling. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002.
Kelson, Mark and David Allen. "Boards of Directors: New Requirements and
Responsibilities for Audit Committees." Insights. 16.10. October 2002. 8-15.
Ketz, J. Edward. Hidden Financial Risk: Understanding Off Balance Sheet Accounting.
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.: New Jersey: 2003.
Kieso, Donald, Jerry J. Weygandt, and Terry D. Warfield. Intermediate Accounting. 11th
ed. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2005. 1017-1063.
KPMG. "Challenges for U.S. Standard Setters." Defining Issues. 07-11 (April2007) 1-6.
Lander, Gerald. "VIES: More Questions than Answers (FIN 46R)." USF-FICPA
Accounting Conference. 19 October 2006.
Martin, Jimmy W. "Auditor Skepticism and Revenue Transactions." The CPA Journal.
(August 2002) 10 March 2007. <http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2002/0802/
features/f083 002.htm>.
McGuiness, John F. "Impact ofSarbanes-Oxley Act on Benefits and Executive
Compensation." Journal of Deferred Compensation. 8,2. Winter 2003. 55-68.
McLean, Bethany and Peter Elkind. The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise
and Scandalous Fall ofEnron. New York: Penguin Group, 2003.
McLean, Bethany. " Is Enron Overpriced?" Fortune. 143.5 (March 5, 2001): 122.
Miller, Richard I. and Paul H. Pashkoff. "Regulations Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act."
Journal of Accountancy. 194, 4 October 2002. 33-36.

Christian 78
Moore, Matt. "Bankrupt Enron No. 5 in Fortune 500 List." Associated Press. Houston
Chronicle. 4 April2002. 26 March 2007. <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
speci~l/enron/1327642.html> .

"Project Updates: Revenue Recognition." Financial Accounting Standards Board. 6
March 2007. 23 March 2007. <http://www.fasb.org/project/
revenue_recognition.html>.
Reinstein, Alan, Gerald Lander, and Stephen Danese. "Consolidation of Variable Interest
Entities: Applying the Provisions ofFIN 46(R)." The CPA Journal 76.8 (August
2006): 28-34.
Rezaee, Zabihollah. "Causes, consequences, and deterrence of financial statement fraud."
Critical Perspectives on Accounting. Academic Press, 2003.
Scharff, M. M. "Understanding WorldCom's Accounting Fraud: Did Groupthink Play a
Role?" Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies. 11.3 (2005): 109-118.
Scarpati, Stephen A. "CPAs as Audit Committee Members." Journal of Accountancy.
196, 3. September 2003. 32.
Serwer, Andy. "Stop Whining about SarbOx." Fortune. 154.3 (7 August 2006): 39.
SFAS No. 13. "Accounting for Leases." Financial Accounting Standards Board.
November 1976.
"Socially Responsible Investing Gains Ground Worldwide." Funds International.
London. (April2005): 10.
Solomon, Deborah. "Corporate Governance: At What Price? Critics say the cost of
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley is a lot higher than it should be." The Wall Street
Journal. 17 October 2005.

Christian 79
Soroosh, Jalal and Jack T. Ciesielski. "Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised:
FASB Interpretation 46(R)." The CPA Journal. 74.7 (July 2004): 30-37.
Turner, Lynn E. and Thomas R. Weirich. "A Closer Look at Financial Statement
Restatements: Analyzing the Reasons Behind the Trend." The CPA Journal.
(December 2006). 6 April2007. <http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2006/1206/
infocus/p 12.htm> .
United States Congress. Sarbanes Oxley Act of2002. Begun 23 January 2002. 15 March
2006. <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf>.
"The WorldCom Fraud." American Institute ofCettified Public Accountants. 2005. 1o
November 2006. <http://www.aicpa.org/downloadlantifraud/12l.ppt>.

